Web 2 War

In "Using Web 2.0 as a Weapon" (Professional Notes, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, February 2010), Lieutenant Randal T. Jones discusses how RSS feeds, blogs, Wikis and mash ups are being used by the military. The Lieutenant points to the US Army Knowledge Online (AKO) as an example of a secure intranet with RSS feeds and blogs. He cites the US intelligence Intellipedia as an example of a successful classified Wiki and the Army's Tactical Ground Reporting Network (TiGRNET) as a mash-up. I could not find any publicly available references to TiGRNet, but it may be similar to the Tactical Ground Reporting System (TIGR).

However, this use of technology is not all one sided. Later in the same journal, Norman Friedman ("Stealing Signals") reports that from 2004 insurgents in Iraq were intercepting video from US Predator UAVs and have been doing so in Afghanistan as late as 2009. What is not clear is why these signals were being transmitted unencrypted or if they were of any practical value to the insurgents. A few fleeting images from a UAV would be of little value. But Web 2.0 technology is now available to anyone with a smart phone and this could make scattered images of far higher intelligence value.

Military presentations and social media

Two publications on better presentations caught my eye in the NLA reading room today. One on how to use Twitter during presentations, the other on how military personnel can prepare better presentations.

The Backchannel: How Audiences are Using Twitter and Social Media and Changing Presentations Forever (Cliff Atkinson, 240 pages, New Riders Press, 2009) gives a step by step guide on how to use Twitter during a presentation for audience feedback. It also covers alternatives to Twitter which are better suited for discussion of presentations and how to set up a web version of your talk to allow for this. It is a very good "how to" as well as "why to" guide.

Towards better presentations (Commander Diane Boettcher, Professional Notes, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, February 2010) is a short article urging military personnel to prepare better presentations. Having suffered from having to sit through many overly long bullet point acronym loaded PowerPoint presentations by defence personnel, I hope the suggestions are headed. I particularly like the suggestion to writing notes to accompany slide presentations. As the commander points out, slide decks tend to take on a life of their own and your presentation, or some slides from it may be widely circulated. If accompanied by some notes the presentation will make much more sense.

It would be interesting to see if the military are making use of the Twitter-type back channel for presentations. Clearly Twitter could not be used for classified presentations, but more secure systems with more limited coverage could be used.

From Research to the Real World

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where former student Kevin Moore from General Dynamics Mediaware is talking about Commercialising Research: Real-world Applications and Challenges of Digital Video. His company's applications include processing video from the US Predator UAV aircraft used by the US military in Afghanistan and sport video at the Beijing Olympics.

Dr. Moore is discussing how an idea from a research project becomes a commercial product. He pointed out that licensing the intellectual property from a research organisation may take years and require a share of the company or licensing fees . Mediaware obtained government and defence start-up grants, but even so the founders did not take salaries initially and the company started out in a very modest office. The company moved from selling consumer vdeo software to "prosumers". Customers were not just the usual home video market, but also lawyers and professionals. The company is modestly successful, with 90% of the revenue from outside of Australia. In 2008 the company was purchased by General Dynamics, but still operates out of Canberra.

Dr. Moore suggested not "chasing the market" but instead concentrate what real customers need. He used the example of the product InStream. The market was for regioanl TV broadcasters who needed to insert local advertisments into TV content for new HD TV. Existing prodycts ere designed for capital city stations and not affordable for small stations. The traditional was to implement this would be to decode the MPEG video, insert the ads and recode. Mediaware produced a software based system to insert the ads.

From prototype to product took 18 months. This was used by Prime for the Beijing Olympics and won an award. Despite this success, the product still does not have another customer. One problem is that potential customers do not believe that such a product is technically possible and therefore there is not a demand.One obvious use I can see for this technology is to insert information into the video stream from UAV surveillance aircraft.

Dr. Moore then showed examples of JPEG2000 for Wide Area Airborne Surveillance. Military manned and unmanned aircraft in Afghanistan are recording very large amounts of video data over wide areas. This is creating a large data management problem. Mediaware are working on systems to manage this. He commented on the difficulty of collecting requirements from users where the application is highly classified. Another issues is to adjust the quality of the video to suit the avialable military bandwidth.

Dr. Moore then invited the ANU students to apply for a job.

Processing Predator UAV Video

Kevin Moore from Canberra company General Dynamics Mediaware will talk at the ANU in Canberra today about how they compress video, in: Commercialising Research: Real-world Applications and Challenges of Digital Video. Applications include processing video from the US Predator UAV aircraft used by the US military in Afghanistan and the Beijing Olympics. Mediaware hires ANU students to work on software.

Seminar Details
Commercialising Research: Real-world Applications and Challenges of Digital Video
Kevin Moore (General Dynamics Mediaware)
COMPUTER VISION AND ROBOTICS SERIES

DATE: 2010-02-25
TIME: 16:00:00 - 17:00:00
LOCATION: RSISE Seminar Room, ground floor, building 115, cnr. North and Daley Roads, ANU
CONTACT: Jochen.Trumpf@anu.edu.au

ABSTRACT:
MPEG video compression and transmission standards are a major enabling technology driving the digital broadcast and distribution industries. Digital television, IPTV DVDs and Blu-ray Discs all use variants of MPEG to transmit and display content. General Dynamics Mediaware is a Canberra company that has been engaged in research and implementation of MPEG technologies for over ten years, and has emerged as a leading global developer and supplier of compressed digital video processing solutions to the Broadcast and Defence industries.

In this presentation, we will introduce Mediaware's unique compressed-domain frame-accurate MPEG repurposing technologies, whose commercial applications include

- Real-time splicing systems deployed by Prime TV across the Australia's East Coast, facilitating the HD TV broadcast of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games;

- Stream capturing, analysing, annotation, editing software integrated in General Dynamics Multi-Int Analysis and Archive System, and in General Atomics Predator ground station.

We will describe MPEG-4 AVC/H.264, the standard used in HD TV, Blu-ray DVD and by services such as YouTube and iTunes, and present some of the technical challenges of compressed-domain editing given its computational complexity.
BIO:
Dr Kevin Moore is the Chief Technology Officer of General Dynamics Mediaware and is responsible for identifying and developing Mediaware's product and technology strategic vision.

Joining Mediaware in 1998 shortly after it was founded, Kevin was part of the engineering team responsible for the development of Mediaware's core capabilities in native MPEG and H.264/AVC editing, compressed domain scene change detection, video playback, stream capture, and helped build the first two generations of desktop editing products.

Prior to joining Mediaware, Kevin spent 7 years as a Research Scientist at CSIRO, Australia's national science agency, working on a range of image processing and scientific data visualization projects. Kevin has BSc and PhD degrees in Computer Science from the Australian NationalUniversity, and a broad background in video and image processing, high performance computing and software engineering.

Social Networking for the War on Terror

In "Exchange Rate" Tim Ripley (Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 January 2010), describes a broadband system used by coalition forces in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, while western military organisations have been using the Internet for more than a decade, this has largely been confined to particular arms of national forces, rarely linking outside the forces of one country and far from the battlefield. Tim describes the work of the NATO Communications and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA), with its Mission Secret Network linking command centres in Afghanistan. The UK Joint Command and Control Support Programme (J2SP) was not ready so the built an interim "Project Over task". managed by the Defence Information Infrastructure Integrated Project Team (IPT). They still do not have the much heralded "Common Mission Secret Configurable Network", but have improved on previous stovepipe US systems (where each part of each service only communicated with its own headquarters). NATO have a set of applications for VOIP and Adobe Acrobat Connect. This includes NATO Joint Chat (J-Chat) for military chat rooms, Wiseweb and Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination Systems (JADOCS). Wiseweb provides a web based interface to information. Despite all this it seems to me that NATO are a long way behind the state of the art in the implementation of web based systems, compared to commercial practice. In particular the use HTML 5, smart phone compatible formats and of e-book formats, shows considerable potential for the military. This would also allow access at lower echelons, where there are currently data rate limitations and limits due to display devices. The commander in the back of an armoured vehicle in the field will not have the big screen and broadband connection of the headquarters, but that doesn't mean they can't have the same data.

Electronic warfare and radar imaging aircraft

Professor Chris Baker talked on "Aspects of imaging radar" at The Australian National University, 28 January 2010. He pointed out that high performance computers now allow synthetic radar images to be created on-board aircraft, where previously hours of processing on a ground station would be required. It occurs to me that this could be applied to the Super Hornet EA-18G Growler aircraft the Australian government has ordered. These aircraft could then be used in conditions not suitable for the Boeing Wedgetail.

The EA-18G Growler is designed for electronic warfare. What the Australian Government has ordered is twelve Super Hornet aircraft to be fitted with extra wiring to allow radio transmitters and receivers to be attached to the aircraft. The receivers detect transmissions from enemy communications and radar. The transmitters then send false signals to confuse the enemy. However, Australia has not ordered any electronic warfare equipment for the aircraft, just the wiring. It is likely the USA will not permit Australia to have the most sophisticated equipment for the aircraft, nor allow Australia to modify the software and equipment for local conditions. It is likely that DSTO will develop local equipment for the aircraft.

As the EA-18G aircraft will be equipped with radar frequency transmitters and receivers, these could also be used to provide 360 degree radar coverage around the aircraft. Australia has ordered four Boeing Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft with very large radars and processing capacity. But these are modified airliners and so are slow and vulnerable to attack. The EA-18G is much smaller and faster, but would not normally be considered for a flying radar picket, due to limited space for antennas and processing computers. But as Professor Baker pointed out in his talk, processing power can now be fitted into a much smaller space and can overcome many limitations of the antenna size. High performance computers can be built from video game chips and podcasting can be used to send the resulting images directly to troops on the ground.

Australia and Cyber-warfare Book on Attacks from China

The book "Australia and Cyber-warfare" is very useful for putting the new Australian Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) into perspective. The section on "China’s cyber-attack capability" is relevant to Google's recent allegations of attacks from China.

There are very well formatted free web and mobile versions of the book available online, as well as a print on demand edition.

Australia and Cyber-warfare

Gary Waters, Desmond Ball and Ian Dudgeon

Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 168

ISBN 9781921313790 (Print version) $19.95 (GST inclusive)
ISBN 9781921313806 (Online)
Published July 2008

This book explores Australia’s prospective cyber-warfare requirements and challenges. It describes the current state of planning and thinking within the Australian Defence Force with respect to Network Centric Warfare, and discusses the vulnerabilities that accompany the use by Defence of the National Information Infrastructure (NII), as well as Defence’s responsibility for the protection of the NII. It notes the multitude of agencies concerned in various ways with information security, and argues that mechanisms are required to enhance coordination between them. It also argues that Australia has been laggard with respect to the development of offensive cyber-warfare plans and capabilities. Finally, it proposes the establishment of an Australian Cyber-warfare Centre responsible for the planning and conduct of both the defensive and offensive dimensions of cyber-warfare, for developing doctrine and operational concepts, and for identifying new capability requirements. It argues that the matter is urgent in order to ensure that Australia will have the necessary capabilities for conducting technically and strategically sophisticated cyber-warfare activities by the 2020s.

The Foreword has been contributed by Professor Kim C. Beazley, former Minister for Defence (1984–90), who describes it as ‘a timely book which transcends old debates on priorities for the defence of Australia or forward commitments, [and] debates about globalism and regionalism’, and as ‘an invaluable compendium’ to the current process of refining the strategic guidance for Australia’s future defence policies and capabilities. ...

Table of Contents

Abstract

Contributors

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Foreword by Professor Kim C. Beazley

Chapter 1. Introduction: Australia and Cyber-warfare

Chapter 2. The Australian Defence Force and Network Centric Warfare

Introduction

The ADF’S NCW Concept

Networks

Shared situational awareness

Self-synchronisation

Balancing risks and opportunities

The NCW Roadmap

The human dimension

Accelerating change and innovation

Defence’s Information Superiority and Support Concept

Networking issues

The ADF’s capability planning for NCW

Maritime

Land

Aerospace

ISR

Joint force

Coalition

Conclusion

Chapter 3. Information Warfare—Attack and Defence

Introduction

The value of information

Open source information

Information Warfare

How would an adversary attack us?

China’s cyber-attack capability

What should we do?

Conclusion

Chapter 4. Targeting Information Infrastructures

Introduction

The information society

Information Infrastructures: the NII, GII and DII

The National Information Infrastructure

The Global Information Infrastructure

The Defence Information Infrastructure

Information Infrastructures: Some key characteristics

Components

Connectivity

Bandwidth

Functional interdependence

Ownership and control

The Importance of Information Assurance

Targeting Information Infrastructures: who and why?

Nation-state targeting

Targeting by non-state organisations

Targeting: objectives

Targeting: capabilities required

Psychological operations

Database management

Computer Network Operations (CNO)

Other weapons and methodologies

Media

HUMINT assets

Additional capabilities

Targeting: vulnerability and accessibility

Vulnerabilities

Accessibility

Intelligence

Conclusion

Chapter 5. Protecting Information Infrastructures

Introduction

Balancing information superiority and operational vulnerability

Vulnerabilities

Balancing security and privacy in information sharing

Managing security risk

Managing privacy risk

Dangers in getting privacy wrong

Cyber-security

Critical Infrastructure Protection in Australia

Securing the Defence enterprise

Trusted information infrastructure

Addressing the national requirement

Conclusion

Chapter 6. An Australian Cyber-warfare Centre

Introduction

The relevant organisations and their coordination

Research, planning and preparation

Offensive activities

Information Warfare and the intelligence process

Command issues

A premium on ante-bellum activities

Rules of engagement, doctrine and operational concepts

Capability planning

Location of a Cyber-warfare Centre

Regional developments

Conclusion

Bibliography

Index

Imaging radar seminar

Chris J Baker will talk on "Aspects of imaging radar" 28 January 2010 at The Australian National University. Prior to becoming Dean of Engineering and Computer Science at ANU, Chris Baker held the Thales chair of intelligent radar systems at University College London.

APPLIED SIGNAL PROCESSING SERIES

Aspects of imaging radar

Chris J Baker (The Australian National University)

DATE: 2010-01-28
TIME: 11:00:00 - 12:00:00
LOCATION: RSISE Seminar Room, ground floor, building 115, cnr. North and Daley Roads, ANU



ABSTRACT:
Improving the resolving ability of a radar systems leads to an increase in information content in the received echo. Perhaps the clearest example of this is two dimensional SAR imaging which provides a map like picture of the surface of the earth. As resolution is increased still further it becomes possible to identify smaller and smaller objects. This seminar begins by exploring the concept of resolution and then goes on to examine techniques for generating high resolution in radar systems including imaging radar. Subsequently, the topic of automatic target classification is introduced very much from a practical systems perspective, reviewing techniques and outlining the current state of the art. Throughout real world examples exploiting data derived from advanced experimental systems are used to demonstrate actual radar and classification performance.

BIO:
Chris Baker is the Dean of the College of Engineering and Computer Science at the Australian National University (ANU). Prior to this he held the Thales-Royal Academy of Engineering Chair of intelligent radar systems based at University College London. He has been actively engaged in radar system research since 1984 and is the author of over two hundred publications. His research interests include, Coherent radar techniques, radar signal processing, radar signal interpretation, Electronically scanned radar systems, natural echo locating systems and radar imaging. He is the recipient of the IEE Mountbatten premium (twice), the IEE Institute premium and is a fellow of the IEE. Until 2008 he was the chairman of the IEE Radar, Sonar and Navigation systems professional network. He is a visiting Professor at the University of Cape Town, Cranfield University, University College London and Adelaide University.

Defence ICT Strategy

The Australian Department of Defence have issued the "Defence Information and Communications Technology Strategy 2009". This is available as a 64 page (1.5 Mbyte) PDF file. This is very brief and readable for a Defence document, with the executive summary being less than one page.

Also Figure 13 is of interest "ICT Technology Bundling Strategy", which attempts to show the complex systems and networks in one diagram. This shows Deployed, Distributed Computing, Terrestrial Communications, Service desks, the Network Operations Centre, Tactical interfaces, Satellite terminals, Intelligence links, High Frequency Radio, the Internet, PABXs, Applications, mobile services, printers, DRN, DSN, DTSN, Encryptors, phones, the PSTN, Gateways and routers. About all it lacks is the National Boradband Network. Other diagrams are less useful, such as, Figure Eight "An Illustrative view of the Integrated Defence Architecture (IDA)".

Executive Summary

In the current environment, Defence’s information and communications technology (ICT) systems are being challenged more than ever. Australia’s Defence personnel expect to see capability improvements resulting from integrated and network-enabled platforms, administrators expect ICT enhancements to provide business process efficiencies and the ICT threat environment is becoming more hostile.

The ICT strategy has been developed to address shortcomings in governance, planning and control frameworks for ICT. Defence is also establishing clear lines of accountability and transparent management responsibilities at the most senior levels, as well as investing in critically under-funded capabilities to improve its ICT infrastructure.

Objectives
After wide-spread engagement and consultation across Defence five clear objectives regarding Defence’s future ICT environment were identified. These are:

• greater ICT scalability, flexibility and adaptability
• improved information speed and accuracy
• continued technological capability edge
• enhanced interoperability
• improved business support

Achieving those objectives will require strategic reforms, as outlined in the Defence Strategic Reform Program, as well as reform of ICT processes, systems and workforce arrangements. These reforms will enhance Defence’s ability to develop ICT capabilities by allowing stakeholders to prioritise their ICT funding, and will optimise the structure of Defence’s ICT workforce to deliver reliable, high-quality solutions.

To achieve these objectives this strategy is based on four strategic imperatives:

1. Optimise the value of Defence’s ICT investment through cost transparency, improved stakeholder communication, prioritisation of spend and efficiency in ICT activities.
2. Drive closer alignment with stakeholders through a stakeholder-centric organisation model, improving engagement and driving towards a collaborative approach to developing ICT capabilities.
3. Provide agreed, priority solutions through the establishment of a Defence-wide ICT Operating Model and Enterprise Architecture promoting standardisation and consolidation.
4. Strengthen ICT capabilities through improvements to culture, leadership, processes, skills, sourcing and resource planning.
   

From: Defence Information and Communications Technology Strategy 2009, 9 November 2009

In-flight entertainment system for military briefings

According to Flight International, the United Arab Emirates air force will equip three Airbus A330 Tanker Transport aircraft with an in-flight entertainment system for each seat. This is a result of using the same fit-out for the aircraft as used by the national carrier Etihad Airways. One consequence of this is that the entertainment system could be used for military briefings during the flight. The entertainment system would be able to provide briefings via the audio and video on demand system. The system has 10.4 inch touch-screens for economy seats.

Singapore airlines A380 airliners have OpenOffice.org's office software available from passenger seats, with plug in USB keybards. This would allow the passengers to watch powerpoint type presentations, as well as read Microsoft Word format word processing documents and spreadsheets. With th seats equipped with in-flight two way audio, this would provide the aircraft with limited capacity to be an in-flight command centre. The cost of this would be far lower than a custom military installation.

Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Martin C. Libicki) is a RAND report for the US Airforce which details the difficulties of dealing with attacks on military and civilian computer infrastructure. It argues that the traditional military doctrine of a threat of a cyber attack to deter an aggressor will not be effective in cyberwarfare. Also conventional military force will have limited value in responding to a cyberattack, due to the difficulty of identifying the attacker.

The book is available as a free e-book: Summary Only (File size 0.3 Mbytes) and Full Document (1.8 Mbytes, 240 Pages), as well as a printed paperback.

Contents

Preface iii
Figures ix
Tables xi
Summary xiii
Acknowledgements xxi
Abbreviations xxiii

Chapter One
Introduction 1
Purpose 5
Basic Concepts and Monograph Organization 6

Chapter Two
A Conceptual Framework 11
The Mechanisms of Cyberspace 12
External Threats 13
Internal Threats 20
Insiders 20
Supply Chain 21
In Sum 22
Defining Cyberattack 23
Defining Cyberdeterrence 27

Chapter Three
why Cyberdeterrence Is Different 39
Do We Know Who Did It? 41
vi Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar
Can We Hold Their Assets at Risk? 52
Can We Do So Repeatedly? 56
If Retaliation Does Not Deter, Can It at Least Disarm? 59
Will Third Parties Join the Fight? 62
Does Retaliation Send the Right Message to Our Own Side? 64
Do We Have a Threshold for Response? 65
Can We Avoid Escalation? 69
What If the Attacker Has Little Worth Hitting? 70
Yet the Will to Retaliate Is More Credible for Cyberspace 71
A Good Defense Adds Further Credibility 73

Chapter Four
why the Purpose of the Original Cyberattack Matters 75
Error 76
Oops 76
No, You Started It 77
Rogue Operators 78
The Command-and-Control Problem 78
Coercion 79
Force 82
Other 86
Implications 90

Chapter FIve
A Strategy of response 91
Should the Target Reveal the Cyberattack? 92
When Should Attribution Be Announced? 93
Should Cyberretaliation Be Obvious? 94
Is Retaliation Better Late Than Never? 96
Retaliating Against State-Tolerated Freelance Hackers 98
What About Retaliating Against CNE? 102
Should Deterrence Be Extended to Friends? 104
Should a Deterrence Policy Be Explicit? 106
Can Insouciance Defeat the Attacker’s Strategy? 108
Confrontation Without Retaliation 109
The Attacker’s Perspective 112
Signaling to a Close 114

Chapter Six
Strategic Cyberwar 117
The Purpose of Cyberwar 118
The Plausibility of Cyberwar 121
The Limits of Cyberwar 122
The Conduct of Cyberwar 125
Cyberwar as a Warning Against Cyberwar 126
Preserving a Second-Strike Capability 127
Sub-Rosa Cyberwar? 128
A Government Role in Defending Against Cyberwar 129
Managing the Effects of Cyberwar 131
Terminating Cyberwar 135
Conclusions 137

Chapter Seven
Operational Cyberwar 139
Cyberwar as a Bolt from the Blue 143
Dampening the Ardor for Network-Centric Operations 149
Attacks on Civilian Targets 153
Organizing for Operational Cyberwar 154
Conclusions 158

Chapter eight
Cyberdefense 159
The Goal of Cyberdefense 160
Architecture 165
Policy 167
Strategy 169
Operations 170
Hardware 171
Deception 171
Red Teaming 173
Conclusions 173

Chapter Nine
Tricky Terrain 175
viii Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Appendixes
A. what Constitutes an Act of war in Cyberspace? 179
B. The Calculus of explicit versus Implicit Deterrence 183
C. The Dim Prospects for Cyber Arms Control 199
references 203 ...

Summary

The establishment of the 24th Air Force and U.S. Cyber Command marks the ascent of cyberspace as a military domain. As such, it joins the historic domains of land, sea, air, and space. All this might lead to a belief that the historic constructs of war—force, offense, defense, deterrence—can be applied to cyberspace with little modification.

Not so. Instead, cyberspace must be understood in its own terms, and policy decisions being made for these and other new commands must reflect such understanding. Attempts to transfer policy constructs from other forms of warfare will not only fail but also hinder policy and planning.

What follows focuses on the policy dimensions of cyberwar: what it means, what it entails, and whether threats can deter it or defense can mitigate its effects. The Air Force must consider these issues as it creates new capabilities.

Cyberattacks Are Possible Only Because Systems Have Flaws

As long as nations rely on computer networks as a foundation for military and economic power and as long as such computer networks are accessible to the outside, they are at risk. Hackers can steal information, issue phony commands to information systems to cause them to malfunction, and inject phony information to lead men and machines to reach false conclusions and make bad (or no) decisions. ...

Operational Cyberwar Has an Important Niche Role, but Only That

For operational cyberwar—acting against military targets during a war—to work, its targets have to be accessible and have vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities have to be exploited in ways the attacker finds useful. It also helps if effects can be monitored. ...

Strategic Cyberwar Is Unlikely to Be Decisive

No one knows how destructive any one strategic cyberwar attack would be. Estimates of the damage from today’s cyberattacks within the United States range from hundreds of billions of dollars to just a few billion dollars per year. ...

Cyberdeterrence May Not Work as Well as Nuclear Deterrence

The ambiguities of cyberdeterrence contrast starkly with the clarities of nuclear deterrence. In the Cold War nuclear realm, attribution of attack was not a problem; the prospect of battle damage was clear; the 1,000th bomb could be as powerful as the first; counterforce was possible; there were no third parties to worry about; private firms were not expected to defend themselves; any hostile nuclear use crossed an acknowledged threshold; no higher levels of war existed; and both sides
always had a lot to lose. Although the threat of retaliation may dissuade cyberattackers, the difficulties and risks suggest the perils of making threats to respond, at least in kind. Indeed, an explicit deterrence posture that encounters a cyberattack with obvious effect but nonobvious source creates a painful dilemma: respond and maybe get it wrong, or refrain and see other deterrence postures lose credibility. ...

Can retaliators hold assets at risk?

It is possible to understand the target’s architecture and test attack software in vivo and still not know how the target will respond under attack. Systems vary by the microsecond. Undiscovered system processes may detect and override errant operations or alert human operators. How long a system malfunctions (and thus how costly the attack is) will depend on how well its administrators understand what went wrong and can respond to the problem. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that attackers in cyberspace will have assets that can be put at risk through cyberspace. ...

will third parties stay out of the way?

Cyberattack tools are widely available. If nonstate actors jump into such confrontations, they could complicate attribution or determining whether retaliation made the original attackers back off.

Might retaliation send the wrong message?

Most of the critical U.S. infrastructure is private. An explicit deterrence policy may frame cyberattacks as acts of war, which would indemnify infrastructure owners from third-party liability, thereby reducing their incentive
to invest in cybersecurity. ...

Responses to Cyberattack Must Weigh Many Factors

In many ways, cyberwar is the manipulation of ambiguity. Not only do successful cyberattacks threaten the redibility of untouched systems (who knows that they have not been corrupted?) but the entire enterprise is beset with ambiguities. Questions arise in cyberwar that have
few counterparts in other media.

what was the attacker trying to achieve?

Because cyberwar can rarely break things much less take things, the more-obvious motives of war do not apply. If the attacker means to coerce but keep its identity hidden, will the message be clear? If the attack was meant to disarm its target but does so only temporarily, what did the attacker want to accomplish in the interim?

Military Cyberdefense Is Like but Not Equal to Civilian Cyberdefense

Because military networks mostly use the same hardware and software as civilian networks, they have mostly the same vulnerabilities. Their defense resembles nothing so much as the defense of civilian networks—
a well-practiced art. But military networks have unique features ...

Implications for the Air Force

The United States and, by extension, the U.S. Air Force, should not make strategic cyberwar a priority investment area. Strategic cyberwar, by itself, would annoy but not disarm an adversary. Any adversary that merits a strategic cyberwar campaign to be subdued also likely possesses the capability to strike back in ways that may be more than annoying. ...

From: Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, Martin C. Libicki, RAND, 2009

Patterns for Designing Military Computer Applications

NCOIC Patterns are a set of freely guides for designing military computer applications. These would be of use in software engineering courses to teach the use of pattern languages and in building civilian emergency and security systems. NCOIC is a non-profit Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium, promoting the interoperation of computer applications and data communications used by the military.

NCOIC provide numerous technical overviews of their work. These are provided in the form of PDF documents, Powerpoint slides and synchronised multimedia presentations. Unfortunately these suffer the problem of many defence related documents being unnecessarly large and complex.

1. Technical Overview
2. Building Blocks Database
3. Mobile Emergency Communications Interoperability Report
4. Mobile Networking Overview
5. Mobile Networking Evaluation (MNE)
6. Instant Messaging Protocol Functional Collection

Robots at war

"Wired for war : the robotics revolution" (Singer, P. W. 2009) is a very readable book about the use of robots in modern warfare. It suffer from having a very US centric view of the field and providing a few too many anecdotes. But it is an easy read for someone needing an overview.

Singer starts with anecdotes about the use of bomb disposal robots in Iraq. He describes the origins and different development philosophies of the two major companies supplying the US defence department. Having attended a seminar by Professor Rodney Brooks, an Australian from Adelaide and one of the founders of iRobot, I can see that Singer's analysis is insightful.

What is missing is the discussion of the development of robotics outside the USA and the role of the scientific research community. As an example, the Aerosonde UAV, which is now being marketed to the military, was developed in Melbourne, (Australia), for taking meteorological measurements (thus the name "Aero-sonde". The aircraft was later adapted for other remote sensing and military applications.

Aerosonde pioneered small long endurance autonomous UAVs (having flow across the North Atlantic). Previously it was assumed that UAVs small enough for a person to lift would only have a range of a few hours.

One problem with innovation is having something too different from the competition. Aerosonde faced this with their early models which were controlled from an ordinary laptop computer. This removed the need for specialised control units. But rather than being seen as an advantage, this counted as a disadvantage in the logic of military procurement. With the Aerosonde Mark 4.7, released in March, there has been effort to provide compatibility with military UAV systems, such as NATO STANAG 4586 standards for UAV ground stations (also see the STANAG-4586 LinkedIn Group).

Aerosonde also pioneered the idea of UAVs being provided as a service, rather than individual aircraft purchased by the customer. This idea is yet to take off with UAV customers, but with widespread use, it appears an idea who's time has come. This concept is not discussed in Singer's book.

Earlier in the year the Australian and US Defence Departments announced the Multi Autonomous Ground-robotic International Challenge (MAGIC 2010). This is a competition researchers to build a fleet of cooperating autonomous ground vehicle systems (robots) for military and civilian emergency use. These will be tested in Australia in November 2010.

Second generation Military C2 IT

In "The defence IT crowd" (Jane's Defence Weekly, 27, S. 26-318, July 2009) Adam Baddeley, gives a useful overview of developments with the use of IT for military Command and Communication (C2). He starts with the US Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) built by EDS. One interesting point made is that C2 needs to be combined with administration on the one system. The replacement for NMCI is N-GEN from 2010, however, some NMCI functions will continue into 2012.

Nato plans to have its Deployable Communication and Information System (DCIS) from EADS starting tom 2011. This is intended to support 300 users for three years. Complicating the design is the need to interface with national systems from NATO member countries, thorough something named by someone with a sense of humour the Interface with Nations Module (INM).

What is not clear in all theses military acronyms and claims of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) is exactly what the systems do and what any specific military standards are needed. The use of the web now provides an opportunity to meet many of the military requirements using off-the-shelf technology.

Australian Robot Software Wins Award

A team of students Australian National University have won the AIIA 2009 iAward in the Tertiary Student Category for their Linux Robotics Framework. This can be used to develop low cost robots for everything from vacuum cleaners to bomb disposal.

The team's demonstration robot is called Buzz , controlled by a NGW100 network gateway low-powered development board with a Atmel AVR32 processor. This could allow for the development of disposable military robots. Currently each military robot used by the US DoD and the Australian Department of Defence costs more than $100,000.

The Linux Robotics Framework ... can be used to develop robotic systems of varying levels of professionalism. It streamlines the development process for hobbyists and commercial developers alike. The LRF allows for the development of robotics applications on small low-cost system architectures with specific focus on support for the Atmel AVR32 microprocessor. It does this by providing a collection of component modules comprising a reusable and extensible robotics framework. The framework includes interface definitions and the implementation of specific drivers and libraries. The framework is extensible, providing a mechanism for adding new hardware and software drivers.

From: Linux Robotics Framework, ANU Linux Robotics Framework Team, 2009

As noted in Bomb Squad Diary (Glenn Zorpette, IEEE Spectrum, October 2008), the threat from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) is changing rapidly and equipment needs to be constantly modified to adapt to the changes in the tatitics and techniques of the bomb makers. Being able to rapidly modify the software and the hardware of the robots would be an advantage.

Submarines and Stealth Aircraft for Australia

The Australian Government released "Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030" on 2 May 2009. This is a detailed policy document ("white paper") , the unclassified version being 143 pages (PDF 1.83 Mb). The most notable proposals are for 12 long range submarines and 100 stealth fighter bombers. The document is deficient in not discussing the role automation will have in changing defence by 2030. Also the report fails to plan for the use of ICT in defence, which could provide significant savings to pay for the proposed equipment.

There has been concern from commentators over the $100B cost of the proposals and $20B in savings the Government plans to obtain from Defence to pay for them. As a former official in the ADF HQ I can understand that such savings will be difficult to achieve. However, a greater problem may be finding the increased numbers of highly trained personnel to operate all of the proposed equipment and to pay for their training and salaries.

Unmanned Vehicles

A major failing in the white paper is the lack of recognition of the role of automation in reducing the cost and extending the capability of military equipment. While Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), are known in the popular press, there are also now also robot submarines: Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) , and robot tanks: Unmanned ground vehicles (UGV).

The Australian Government plans to acquire seven large high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs in the class of the RQ-4 Global Hawk. Underwater and land based autonomous vehicles are less developed and currently only short range add-ons to manned platforms, but this likely to change before 2030.

Eight new Future Frigates, are envisaged to embark a combination of manned naval combat helicopters and maritime Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). However, apart from that and the long-endurance UAVs, there is no mention of the role of automation in Australia's defence.

Submarines

The paper proposes 12 new longer range submarines. Using conventional technology these vessels will require larger crews that the current submarines, for which the RAN is already having difficulty finding personnel. There are ways in which the submarines to be ordered could be operated with smaller crews. Australian designed and built Joint High Speed Vessels could also extend the range of the submarines.

In addition to automation of the submarines to reduce crews they can have their capabilities extended with Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) , which are essentially torpedo shaped robot submarines. Australia has expertise in this area, with the Australian National University developing a miniature short range AUV and CSIRO operating "gliders" which can operate for 30 days, covering 200 km and relaying data by satellite.

Aircraft Carriers

Australia has already ordered two "Landing Helicopter Dock" (LHD) ships, to be be named HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide (Canberra class). The Spanish design has a "ski jump" on the flight deck for operating aircraft such as the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter. The defence department has denied that there are plans to use these ships for other than helicopter transport. However, it would seem to be reasonable for 24 of the Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft to be the F-35B Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) model, so they can operate from the ships.

Cyber Warfare

The white paper appears to have missed the point that computers and telecommunications have revolutionised the way industry and government operate. The words "Internet" and "Web" do not appear in the document at all. The role of computers and telecommunications are discussed only as an infrastructure to be protected from Cyber Warfare, not as a primarily tool for defence planning and operations. A Cyber Security Operations Centre is proposed to be staffed by ADF and DSTO personnel. It will not be possible for the ADF to maintain the needed level of expertise without civilian assistance of organisations such as AusCert. Without outside assistance the ADF will be vulnerable to cyber attack.

The Department of Defence needs to plan to use ICT to improve both its administrative and military operations. This will require giving up the idea that expertise lies within the department and that there is a unique military approach which only defence personnel can provide. One way the proposed $20B savings can be obtained is by making the operations of the department and the ADF more efficient by increased effective use of ICT.

My experience of nine years in Defence ICT was that while the organisation wanted the benefits of ICT, it was not willing to change the way it operated so as to make the ICT effective. The result was that system projects failed or did not achieve the planed results when implemented, because old ways of working were continued with the new systems.

Excerpts from Defence 2009 White Paper 2009

Submarines
9.3 For the reasons spelled out in Chapter 8, the Government has decided to acquire 12 new Future Submarines, to be assembled in South Australia. This will be a major design and construction program spanning three decades, and will be Australia's largest ever single defence project. The Future Submarine will have greater range, longer endurance on patrol, and expanded capabilities compared to the current Collins class submarine. It will also be equipped with very secure real-time communications and be able to carry different mission payloads such as uninhabited underwater vehicles.
9.4 The Future Submarine will be capable of a range of tasks such as anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare; strategic strike; mine detection and mine-laying operations; intelligence collection; supporting special forces (including infiltration and exfiltration missions); and gathering battlespace data in support of operations.
9.5 Long transits and potentially short-notice contingencies in our primary operational environment demand high levels of mobility and endurance in the Future Submarine. The boats need to be able to undertake prolonged covert patrols over the full distance of our strategic approaches and in operational areas. They require low signatures across all spectrums, including at higher speeds. The Government has ruled out nuclear propulsion for these submarines.
9.6 The complex task of capability definition, design and construction must be undertaken without delay, given the long lead times and technical challenges involved. The Government has already directed that a dedicated project office be established for the Future Submarine within Defence, and will closely oversee this project. ...

Air Combat Capability
9.57 On coming to office, the Government commissioned the Air Combat Capability Review to provide advice on aspects of Australia's air combat requirements. That study and its findings were incorporated into the Force Structure Review.
9.58 The Air Combat Capability Review assessed that the squadron of F/A-18F Super Hornets being acquired as a bridging air combat capability is a highly capable 4.5 generation aircraft and, as long as it retains commonality with the planned US Navy development path, will remain effective until at least 2020. The F/A-18F Super Hornet will begin to enter service from the end of 2010.
9.59 The Review concluded that a fleet of around 100 fifth generation multirole combat aircraft would provide Australia with an effective and flexible air combat capability to 2030. A further judgement of the review was that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the preferred solution for that requirement. Other fourth and fifth generation combat aircraft considered by the Review were judged to be less capable of fulfilling Australia's multirole air combat capability requirements.
9.60 The Government has decided that it will acquire around 100 F-35 JSF, along with supporting systems and weapons. The first stage of this acquisition will acquire three operational squadrons comprising
78 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030
Defence White Paper 2009
not fewer than 72 aircraft. The acquisition of the remaining aircraft will be acquired in conjunction with the withdrawal of the F/A-18F Super Hornet fleet, and will be timed to ensure that no gap in our overall air combat capability occurs.
9.61 Australia's future air combat capability will therefore be based on four operational air combat squadrons consisting initially of three JSF squadrons and a squadron of Super Hornet aircraft, which will be replaced by a fourth JSF squadron. Defence will continue to progressively upgrade the systems and airframes of the current F/A-18 aircraft to ensure that they remain capable and sustainable until the JSF enters service with the ADF.
9.62 Maritime strike capability will be provided by the Hornet and Super Hornet fleets using Harpoon missiles, with the Government to acquire a new maritime strike weapon for the JSF. New air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons will also be acquired.
9.63 There has been considerable public interest in the potential acquisition of the JSF. The Government has examined its capabilities very carefully in the context of the Air Combat Capability Review, and remains confident that the JSF's combination of stealth, advanced sensors, networking and data fusion capabilities, when integrated into the networked ADF, will ensure Australia maintains its strategic capability advantage out to 2030.
9.64 The Government has decided that it would be prudent for the ADF to acquire an airborne electronic attack capability. To that end, it has decided that the production arrangements for the second batch of 12 Australian F/A-18F Super Hornets will include wiring those aircraft to enable them, should later strategic circumstances dictate,to be converted to the electronic warfare 'Growler' variant - the EA-18G. Should we acquire this capability, it would provide a potent ability to protect our own communications and electronic systems while jamming, suppressing or otherwise denying an adversary the full use of the electromagnetic spectrum in the area of operations. ...

Maritime Surveillance and Response
...
9.69 To meet this challenge, the Government will acquire eight new maritime patrol aircraft to replace the current AP-3C Orion fleet. These new aircraft will provide a highly advanced surface search radar and optical, infra-red and electronic surveillance systems. With these systems, along with a high transit speed and the ability to conduct air-to-air refuelling, these aircraft will provide a superior capability for rapid area search and identification tasks. They will also provide a highly advanced ASW capability, including an ability to engage submarines using air-launched torpedoes. After subsequent upgrades, they will be capable of firing stand-off anti-ship missiles.
9.70 We will also acquire up to seven large high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs to supplement the manned maritime patrol aircraft. These large UAVs, with an ocean-spanning range, will markedly expand the surveillance coverage of the maritime approaches to Australia, in both area and duration. They will also have a significant overland capability to provide support to our ground forces in a range of circumstances. Strategic UAVs provide persistent ISR, enhancing our situational awareness in both the land and maritime domains. ...

Cyber Warfare
9.85 In the past decade the growing importance of operations in cyberspace has become more apparent. Our national security could potentially be compromised by cyberattacks on our defence, wider governmental, commercial or infrastructure-related information networks. The potential impacts of such attacks have grown with Defence's increasing reliance on networked operations. Therefore, we must focus on developing capabilities that allow us to gain an edge in the cyberspace domain, and protect ourselves.
9.86 This emerging threat will require significant and sustained investment by Defence in new technology and analytical capability to guard the integrity of its own information and ensure the successful conduct of operations.
9.87 The Government has decided to invest in a major enhancement of Defence's cyber warfare capability. A comprehensive range of expanded and new capabilities will maximise Australia's strategic capacity and reach in this field. Many of these capabilities remain highly classified, but in outline they consist of a much-enhanced cyber situational awareness and incident response capability, and the establishment of a Cyber Security Operations Centre to coordinate responses to incidents in cyberspace.
9.88 The Cyber Security Operations Centre will include a continuously staffed watch office and an analysis team to respond to cyberthreats in a timely fashion. Its staff will include ADF and DSTO personnel. This new Centre will be created within the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), which already possesses significant cybersecurity expertise.
9.89 While this capability will reside within Defence and be available to provide cyber warfare support to ADF operations, it will be purpose-designed to serve broader national security goals. This includes assisting responses to cyber incidents across government and critical private sector systems and infrastructure. Whole-of-government coordination will be achieved through the appropriate representation within the Centre from relevant Government agencies. Those agencies include the Attorney-General's Department, which has the lead on e-security programs for Government and the private sector, as well as the Australian Federal Police and relevant agencies of the Australian intelligence community.

From: "Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030", Australian Department of Defence, ISBN: 978-0-642-29702-0, 2 May 2009.

In addition to the white paper itself there are available Media Releases
the previous Defence Response to the Mortimer Review and outlines of parts of the white paper proposals:

1. The 2009 Defence White Paper – The Most Comprehensive White Paper of the Modern Era [18.3 KB]
2. The Australian – United States Alliance [17.3 KB]
3. Australia’s Commitment to the United Nations and Multilateral Engagement [18.1 KB]
4. Cooperation with South East Asia and Pacific Nations [16.6 KB]
5. A Globally Flexible Force [25.9 KB]
6. A New Strategic Environment [25.5 KB]
7. A Smarter Defence for a More Complex World [26.7 KB]
8. What the White Paper Means for the Royal Australian Navy [28.1 KB]
9. What the White Paper Means for the Australian Army [28.3 KB]
10. What the White Paper Means for the Royal Australian Air Force [27.8 KB]
11. White Paper Development Process – The Most Comprehensive Yet [17.8 KB]
12. A New Defence White Paper Every Five Years [17.1 KB]
13. The Largest Ever Defence Reform Program [16.7 KB]
14. Remediating Shortfalls and Underinvestment in the Defence Budget [18.1 KB]
15. A More Potent and Capable Submarine Fleet [18.1 KB]
16. Navy to Receive Larger and More Capable Anti-Submarine Warfare Frigates [17.3 KB]
17. A New Era For Navy’s Fleet Air Arm [17.5 KB]
18. Planning Underway For New Offshore Combatant Vessels [17.8 KB]
19. Greater Strategic Sealift For Amphibious Operations [17.7 KB]
20. New Class Of Heavy Landing Craft For Navy [16.2 KB]
21. Navy To Acquire A New Underway Replenishment Vessel [14.5 KB]
22. A Balanced And Flexible Army [17.1 KB]
23. Enhanced Survivability And Mobility Of Land Forces [16.6 KB]
24. A Networked Army On The Battlefield [17.1 KB]
25. Modernisation For Australia’s Dismounted Soldiers [16.4 KB]
26. Delivering A More Potent Helicopter Fleet For The Army [16.6 KB]
27. New Artillery Systems For The Army [16.6 KB]
28. New Fire Support Weapons System For The Australian Army [15.3 KB]
29. Protecting Australia’s Land Forces [16.5 KB]
30. More Language Training For Defence Operating In The Global Village [15.1 KB]
31. UAV Technology To Play A Large Role In The Future ADF [15.3 KB]
32. New Focus On Non-Lethal Weapon Technology For ADF [16.2 KB]
33. Equipping Our Special Forces For The Future [15.2 KB]
34. Government To Enhance The Incident Response Regiment [15.3 KB]
35. Next Generation Of Air Combat Capability For Air Force [18.2 KB]
36. Enhanced Capability for Super Hornets [16.8 KB]
37. Recognised Air Picture Of Australia’s Primary Operational Environment To Be Developed [16.9 KB]
38. Improved Air Traffic Control, Navigation And Communication Systems [16.5 KB]
39. New KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport Aircraft Soon To Enter Service [16.8 KB]
40. Air Force All Set For Advanced Airborne Early Warning & Control Aircraft [15.4 KB]
41. Air Force To Acquire Advanced New Maritime Patrol Aircraft [16.9 KB]
42. A New Era Of Uninhabited Aircraft Operations For Air Force [16.8 KB]
43. New Airlift Capabilities For Air Force [17.5 KB]
44. Navy To Be Equipped With Land Attack Cruise Missiles [16.4 KB]
45. Government Commits To Better Integration Between Reserve And Regular Service in The Australian Defence Force [22.8 KB]
46. Government to Enhance The High Readiness Reserves [17.1 KB]
47. An Enhanced Intelligence Surveillance And Reconnaissance Capability [23.0 KB]
48. Government To Acquire Satellite With Remote Sensing Capability [19.4 KB]
49. Government To Integrate The Defence Intelligence Information Systems [19.8 KB]
50. Enhanced UHF Satellite Communications For Deployed Forces [17.4 KB]
51. New Cyber Security Operations Centre To Enhance Cyber Warfare Capability [18.0 KB]
52. Enhanced Electronic Warfare Capability For Defence [22.1 KB]
53. Joint Command Support System To Be Enhanced [20.3 KB]
54. Government To Build A Networked ADF [22.3 KB]
55. Government To Enhance ADF Counter-Weapons Of Mass Destruction Capabilities [20.0 KB]
56. Government To Improve The Management Of Defence Force Preparedness [20.2 KB]
57. Government To Reconstitute Explosive Ordnance Warstocks [17.2 KB]
58. Substantial Boost to Simulator Training For Defence [16.7 KB]
59. Government Agrees To An Output Focused Business Model For Defence [19.6 KB]
60. A New Independent Advisory Board To Oversee Defence Reforms [21.9 KB]
61. Changes To The Defence Funding Model [24.9 KB]
62. Multi-Million Dollar Investment To Reform Defence ICT [17.5 KB]
63. Government Reform To Defence Shared Services And Procurement Support Services [16.9 KB]
64. DSTO Laboratories For The Future [17.4 KB]
65. Investing In The Defence Force Of The Future [18.5 KB]
66. Government To Improve Housing For Defence Personnel And Their Families [16.8 KB]
67. Defence Families To Receive Improved Support [15.0 KB]
68. Government Announces Additional Investment In Australian Defence Force Health Care [18.1 KB]
69. Increasing Diversity In Defence [25.9 KB]
70. Reforming The Defence Workforce [17.5 KB]
71. Fixing Navy’s Critical Workforce Shortfall [17.6 KB]
72. Government To Invest In Aging Defence Infrastructure And Upgrading Old Accommodation [17.3 KB]
73. Improved Planning For The Future Defence Estate [23.0 KB]
74. Updating Defence Ranges For The Forces Of Tomorrow [15.2 KB]
75. Government To Replace And Consolidate Outdated Logistics Infrastructure [16.8 KB]
76. Government To Enhance Logistics Infrastructure In Townsville [14.8 KB]
77. Government To Enhance Logistics Infrastructure In Darwin [16.7 KB]
    
78. Government To Enhance Operational Logistics Support Infrastructure In Western Australia [15.0 KB]
    
79. Government To Invest In Improved Logistics Planning And Management [15.0 KB]
80. Government To Deliver Billions In Savings [16.6 KB]
81. The Government’s Response To The Mortimer Review [25.3 KB]
82. Government To Support Defence Priority Industry Capabilities [17.6 KB]
83. The Defence White Paper Delivers For Local Industry [17.3 KB]

Iridium Satellite Services for Department of Defence

The Australian Department of Defence has issued a Request for Tender for Iridium Satellite Services (ATM ID CIOG 608/08, 27-Apr-2009). The ADF uses Iridium for test messages, voice and data communications. A detailed tender document is available to registered companies.

The Satellite Operations Section of the Directorate of Communications and Network Operations coordinates the provision of satellite communication services to the Australian Defence Force. The primary intent is to provide a low cost alternate communications means for service personnel within Australia, its littoral regions and across the globe. To achieve this, the ADF has been utilising the Iridium satellite constellation. The Iridium satellite constellation is a system of active communication satellites with spares in orbit and on the ground. It allows worldwide voice and data communications using handheld satellite phones. The Iridium network is unique in that it covers the whole earth, including poles, oceans and airways.

The Australian Defence Force currently utilises the Iridium fleet for paging, voice and data communications.

This Request for Tender aims to replace the current arrangement for the provision of Iridium Satellite Services to the Australian Defence Force. ...

From: Request for Tender for Iridium Satellite Services (ATM ID CIOG 608/08, Australian Department of Defence, 27 April 2009

Australian electronic warfare aircraft

On 11 September 2008 I suggested a relatively quick and easy purchase for Australian defence would be dozen EA-18G Growler aircraft. The Australian government has decided to do this, having 12 of the F/A-18F Super Hornet, which have already been ordered, wired for electronic attack. .This can be done for the relatively modest cost of A$35M, as the cable can be installed while the aircraft are being made.

There are some difficult decisions for the ADF to make. All that has been ordered is the cabling in the aircraft, not the extra sensors and transmitters to plug into the cable. The full offensive electronic warfare suite for the F18s would cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

The US is unlikely to provide the source codes for the EW software, so that Australia would be dependent on the USA for maintenance, upgrades and local requirements. There would be US imposed restrictions on what Australia could do with the aircraft and the relatively high cost of purchase, training and minenance.

Boeing is considering a export version of the F/A-18G. This would have the cabling and sensors to detect electronic emissions, but not transmitters for jamming. This would allow the aircraft to be sold with fewer export restrictions and be cheaper to buy an maintain. Australian might well choose a middle path, having some aircraft equipped with the full offensive capability and some with just sensors. It might also be worthwile plugging locally developed sensors and transmitters into the pre-installed cabling to customise the aircraft for local conditions.

Virtual Reality for Commanding the Australian Defence Force

The Australian Department of Defence has issued a Request for Tender for a "Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) Telepresence System" providing virtual reality meeting rooms. There is a 94 page document available, but only a couple of pages addresses the requirement in very general terms. This seems a good opportunity for those with advanced systems to offer products beyond ordinary video conferencing. One limitation will be compatibility with systems such as those I observed personnel using on the USS Blue Ridge.

The Department of Defence (Defence) requires solutions for a virtual reality meeting capability between two Defence locations in and near Canberra, ACT, Australia.

Defence is seeking a Respondent's proposed solution that will:

a. provide Defence with visibility of Respondents products, indicative costs and options for a virtual reality meeting solution;

b. meet Defence's current and future defence capability requirements;

c. provide Defence with a value-for-money solution;

d. provide significant and sustainable benefits to Defence, defence industry and the Respondent who is ultimately successful in the process; and

e. provide long-term cost benefits and risk reduction to other forms of personnel communications over short, medium and long distances. ...

From: "Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) Telepresence System, AZ4477, Defence Support Group of the, Department of Defence, 23-Feb-2009