Wednesday, November 18, 2009

Defence Budget Audit Needs Needs More ICT

The Minister for Defence, Senator John Faulkner, has released the "2008 Defence Budget Audit" (Pappas Review by George Pappas). Amongst other savings, the report identifies 15 to 30% of possible savings in operating costs for ICT. However, it does not detail this further nor look at the much larger savings (which would be in the billions) by the more effective use of ICT to run Defence. A reduction in ICT spending may be a false economy if it prevents an overall saving in defence, which could be as much as 15% of the total budget.

Rather than the process driven approach which has been tried in Defence many times and failed, I suggest a behaviour driven approach. This would retrain defence staff, both civilian and military with the new skills they need and provide direct incentives for them to use those skills effectively. Also they staff would be provided with the tools to work effectively, particularly ICT systems.

As an example, the audit report identifies video conferencing as a technology for savings, by replacing air travel. However, if staff are not trained in how to use video conference effectively and are not given incentives to use it, the technology will remain underused. At best video conferencing will be used to replace some unproductive face to face meetings with unproductive virtual ones.

Available are:
  1. DEFENCE BUDGET AUDIT RELEASED, Media Release, John Faulkner , Minister for Defence, MIN49/09, 17 November 2009
  2. Response to the Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009
  3. Executive Summary, Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009
  4. Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009
The report recommended changes to Defence operations to reduce cost and increase effectiveness. The Government has accepted many of the recommendations, including to reduce the number of ICT contractors used. Recommendations to close smaller defence bases will be delayed until after the next election.

The executive summary states:
Capturing efficiency while reforming ICT. A holistic ICT transformation is planned to significantly improve the quality of the ICT infrastructure provided to Defence. While the current focus on the transformation effort is primarily on quality, there should be an increased focus on capturing the significant efficiencies in the process.

These reforms could save Defence 15 to 30% per year in operating costs, dependent on the future ICT strategy. These savings are estimated at $215 million per year, but have not been analysed in detail because the ICT strategy is beyond the scope of this review.

From: Executive Summary, Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009
Several of the more general recommendations also relate to the use of ICT more effectively (excerpt appended).

Extensive documentation has been provided for the audit, with an executive summary (8 pages), full report (308 pages) and government response (4 pages). One flaw in this is that the response is a secured PDF document which cannot have text copied from it, making analysis difficult.

More seriously, the report itself is provided in the form of a bitmap images with no accompanying text. As a result it is not possible to search the document nor copy text from the document (copying has been barred for this document in any case). Where a document is only available in hard copy form it may be necessary to scan it in for online distribution. PDF has an option to provide an optical character recognition version of the document for searching, which has not been done in this case. Also this document has not been generated from a paper original, it is from a digital original. Those who produced the PDF version will have had to make a deliberate decision not to provide it in an easy to search text format and so as to limit access to the document by the public. Such action by a public servant is unethical and may be contrary to Australian law. In any case the document provided does not meet the Disability Discrimination Act Advisory Notes issued by the Australian Human Rights Commission likely placing the Department of Defence in breech of the Act.

From the Executive Summary, Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009:
Reducing the cost of Defence inputs can be achieved in three ways:
  • Reducing non-equipment procurement costs. Defence procures a wide range of commercial products and services such as building services, travel and relocation services. Clear opportunities exist to reduce these costs by:
  • Procuring more competitively priced products and services. For example, unbundling routes and removing price arbitrage on removal contracts.
  • Changing the specifications for what is required to obtain less costly products, where doing so will not compromise capability. For example, increasing the procurement requirement that military clothing is imported from low cost countries.
  • Changing patterns of use. For example, making greater use of Defence’s extensive video-conference network rather than undertaking single day travel.
  • These improvements can save Defence between $326 and $518 million per year in non-equipment expenditure.
  • Reducing the cost of major equipment procurement.
Although a longterm task, there are significant opportunities to reduce the cost of major equipment procurement through:
  • Procuring a higher proportion of MOTS equipment
  • Increasing the level of competition for major equipment acquisition and sustainment contracts
  • Reviewing the proportion of local sourcing which is not justified by strategic requirements.
Purchasing a greater proportion of MOTS (which the most recent Defence Capability Plan (DCP) plans for) and increasing the level of competition on major contracts (which partially overlaps with savings identified in the lean backbone section) could ease cost pressures by $345 to $660 million, but these are not ‘banked’ as savings.
  • Reducing the cost of combat capability through the use of Reserves.
    Beyond support functions, there is also an opportunity to deliver the same military capability at a lower cost through a flexible surge model. This model makes expanded use of Reserves and deployable contractors.
    These changes could reduce the cost of combat capability by ~$50 million per year.
The total productivity dividend from all of these measures is in the range of $1.3 to $1.8 billion per year, and a one-off saving of $218 to $398 million. The extent of reform required to capture these savings will take 3 to 5 years. The operational cost savings already identified by Defence (as part of the Defence Savings Plan, also know as ‘E2’) have been integrated with or replaced by the Audit savings, which provide analytical substance, much greater detail and show where Defence can go further to realise additional savings.

Removing the long-term structural inefficiencies of a fragmented estate. This can be achieved by starting the process of consolidating estates into an efficient superbase model, laying the foundation for the next ‘S’ curve in Defence productivity. A superbase model would dramatically reduce subscale base costs,
extensive travel and relocation expenses, and the costs associated with managing a complicated supply-chain network.
The estimated yearly savings from a superbase model that would meet Australia’s strategic requirements would increase over time (assuming a staged consolidation), and could reach $700 to $1,050 million by 2035 (in 2008 dollars). ...

From: Executive Summary, Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009

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Friday, October 16, 2009

Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Cover: Cyberdeterrence and CyberwarCyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Martin C. Libicki) is a RAND report for the US Airforce which details the difficulties of dealing with attacks on military and civilian computer infrastructure. It argues that the traditional military doctrine of a threat of a cyber attack to deter an aggressor will not be effective in cyberwarfare. Also conventional military force will have limited value in responding to a cyberattack, due to the difficulty of identifying the attacker.

The book is available as a free e-book: Summary Only (File size 0.3 Mbytes) and Full Document (1.8 Mbytes, 240 Pages), as well as a printed paperback.
Contents

Preface iii
Figures ix
Tables xi
Summary xiii
Acknowledgements xxi
Abbreviations xxiii

Chapter One
Introduction 1
Purpose 5
Basic Concepts and Monograph Organization 6

Chapter Two
A Conceptual Framework 11
The Mechanisms of Cyberspace 12
External Threats 13
Internal Threats 20
Insiders 20
Supply Chain 21
In Sum 22
Defining Cyberattack 23
Defining Cyberdeterrence 27

Chapter Three
why Cyberdeterrence Is Different 39
Do We Know Who Did It? 41
vi Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar
Can We Hold Their Assets at Risk? 52
Can We Do So Repeatedly? 56
If Retaliation Does Not Deter, Can It at Least Disarm? 59
Will Third Parties Join the Fight? 62
Does Retaliation Send the Right Message to Our Own Side? 64
Do We Have a Threshold for Response? 65
Can We Avoid Escalation? 69
What If the Attacker Has Little Worth Hitting? 70
Yet the Will to Retaliate Is More Credible for Cyberspace 71
A Good Defense Adds Further Credibility 73

Chapter Four
why the Purpose of the Original Cyberattack Matters 75
Error 76
Oops 76
No, You Started It 77
Rogue Operators 78
The Command-and-Control Problem 78
Coercion 79
Force 82
Other 86
Implications 90

Chapter FIve
A Strategy of response 91
Should the Target Reveal the Cyberattack? 92
When Should Attribution Be Announced? 93
Should Cyberretaliation Be Obvious? 94
Is Retaliation Better Late Than Never? 96
Retaliating Against State-Tolerated Freelance Hackers 98
What About Retaliating Against CNE? 102
Should Deterrence Be Extended to Friends? 104
Should a Deterrence Policy Be Explicit? 106
Can Insouciance Defeat the Attacker’s Strategy? 108
Confrontation Without Retaliation 109
The Attacker’s Perspective 112
Signaling to a Close 114

Chapter Six
Strategic Cyberwar 117
The Purpose of Cyberwar 118
The Plausibility of Cyberwar 121
The Limits of Cyberwar 122
The Conduct of Cyberwar 125
Cyberwar as a Warning Against Cyberwar 126
Preserving a Second-Strike Capability 127
Sub-Rosa Cyberwar? 128
A Government Role in Defending Against Cyberwar 129
Managing the Effects of Cyberwar 131
Terminating Cyberwar 135
Conclusions 137

Chapter Seven
Operational Cyberwar 139
Cyberwar as a Bolt from the Blue 143
Dampening the Ardor for Network-Centric Operations 149
Attacks on Civilian Targets 153
Organizing for Operational Cyberwar 154
Conclusions 158

Chapter eight
Cyberdefense 159
The Goal of Cyberdefense 160
Architecture 165
Policy 167
Strategy 169
Operations 170
Hardware 171
Deception 171
Red Teaming 173
Conclusions 173

Chapter Nine
Tricky Terrain 175
viii Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Appendixes
A. what Constitutes an Act of war in Cyberspace? 179
B. The Calculus of explicit versus Implicit Deterrence 183
C. The Dim Prospects for Cyber Arms Control 199
references 203 ...
Summary

The establishment of the 24th Air Force and U.S. Cyber Command marks the ascent of cyberspace as a military domain. As such, it joins the historic domains of land, sea, air, and space. All this might lead to a belief that the historic constructs of war—force, offense, defense, deterrence—can be applied to cyberspace with little modification.

Not so. Instead, cyberspace must be understood in its own terms, and policy decisions being made for these and other new commands must reflect such understanding. Attempts to transfer policy constructs from other forms of warfare will not only fail but also hinder policy and planning.

What follows focuses on the policy dimensions of cyberwar: what it means, what it entails, and whether threats can deter it or defense can mitigate its effects. The Air Force must consider these issues as it creates new capabilities.

Cyberattacks Are Possible Only Because Systems Have Flaws

As long as nations rely on computer networks as a foundation for military and economic power and as long as such computer networks are accessible to the outside, they are at risk. Hackers can steal information, issue phony commands to information systems to cause them to malfunction, and inject phony information to lead men and machines to reach false conclusions and make bad (or no) decisions. ...

Operational Cyberwar Has an Important Niche Role, but Only That

For operational cyberwar—acting against military targets during a war—to work, its targets have to be accessible and have vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities have to be exploited in ways the attacker finds useful. It also helps if effects can be monitored. ...

Strategic Cyberwar Is Unlikely to Be Decisive

No one knows how destructive any one strategic cyberwar attack would be. Estimates of the damage from today’s cyberattacks within the United States range from hundreds of billions of dollars to just a few billion dollars per year. ...

Cyberdeterrence May Not Work as Well as Nuclear Deterrence

The ambiguities of cyberdeterrence contrast starkly with the clarities of nuclear deterrence. In the Cold War nuclear realm, attribution of attack was not a problem; the prospect of battle damage was clear; the 1,000th bomb could be as powerful as the first; counterforce was possible; there were no third parties to worry about; private firms were not expected to defend themselves; any hostile nuclear use crossed an acknowledged threshold; no higher levels of war existed; and both sides
always had a lot to lose. Although the threat of retaliation may dissuade cyberattackers, the difficulties and risks suggest the perils of making threats to respond, at least in kind. Indeed, an explicit deterrence posture that encounters a cyberattack with obvious effect but nonobvious source creates a painful dilemma: respond and maybe get it wrong, or refrain and see other deterrence postures lose credibility. ...

Can retaliators hold assets at risk?

It is possible to understand the target’s architecture and test attack software in vivo and still not know how the target will respond under attack. Systems vary by the microsecond. Undiscovered system processes may detect and override errant operations or alert human operators. How long a system malfunctions (and thus how costly the attack is) will depend on how well its administrators understand what went wrong and can respond to the problem. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that attackers in cyberspace will have assets that can be put at risk through cyberspace. ...

will third parties stay out of the way?

Cyberattack tools are widely available. If nonstate actors jump into such confrontations, they could complicate attribution or determining whether retaliation made the original attackers back off.

Might retaliation send the wrong message?

Most of the critical U.S. infrastructure is private. An explicit deterrence policy may frame cyberattacks as acts of war, which would indemnify infrastructure owners from third-party liability, thereby reducing their incentive
to invest in cybersecurity. ...

Responses to Cyberattack Must Weigh Many Factors

In many ways, cyberwar is the manipulation of ambiguity. Not only do successful cyberattacks threaten the redibility of untouched systems (who knows that they have not been corrupted?) but the entire enterprise is beset with ambiguities. Questions arise in cyberwar that have
few counterparts in other media.

what was the attacker trying to achieve?

Because cyberwar can rarely break things much less take things, the more-obvious motives of war do not apply. If the attacker means to coerce but keep its identity hidden, will the message be clear? If the attack was meant to disarm its target but does so only temporarily, what did the attacker want to accomplish in the interim?

Military Cyberdefense Is Like but Not Equal to Civilian Cyberdefense

Because military networks mostly use the same hardware and software as civilian networks, they have mostly the same vulnerabilities. Their defense resembles nothing so much as the defense of civilian networks—
a well-practiced art. But military networks have unique features ...

Implications for the Air Force

The United States and, by extension, the U.S. Air Force, should not make strategic cyberwar a priority investment area. Strategic cyberwar, by itself, would annoy but not disarm an adversary. Any adversary that merits a strategic cyberwar campaign to be subdued also likely possesses the capability to strike back in ways that may be more than annoying. ...

From: Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, Martin C. Libicki, RAND, 2009

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Wednesday, October 07, 2009

War 2.o Live TV with smaller display

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion. Some on low bandwidth and low performance computers may have difficulty with the full live content (I have suggested a lower frame rate video stream be provided), so I have broken out the components: Live TV, Chat, Social Stream and Media stream. Here is the Live TV, reduced to 100 x 80 pixels:Live TV : Ustream

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War 2.0 Media Stream

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion. Some on low bandwidth and low performance computers may have difficulty with the full live content (I have suggested a lower frame rate video stream be provided), so I have broken out the components: Live TV, Chat, Social Stream and Media stream. Here is the Media Stream:

Broadcasting Live with Ustream.TV

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War 2.0 Social Stream

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion. Some on low bandwidth and low performance computers may have difficulty with the full live content (I have suggested a lower frame rate video stream be provided), so I have broken out the components: Live TV, Chat, Social Stream and Media stream. Here is the Social Stream:

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War 2.0 Chat

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion. Some on low bandwidth and low performance computers may have difficulty with the full live content (I have suggested a lower frame rate video stream be provided), so I have broken out the components: Live TV, Chat, Social Stream and Media stream. Here is the Chat:

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War 2.0 live TV stream

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion. Some on low bandwidth and low performance computers may have difficulty with the full live content (I have suggested a lower frame rate video stream be provided), so I have broken out the components: Live TV, Chat, Social Stream and Media stream. Here is the Live TV:Live TV : Ustream

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War 2.0 streamed live now

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion.

I hope to take part in the symposium via the web (from Web Directions South), relating some of my experience setting the Australian Defence Force's policy for the use of the web and Internet.

Last night the "Timeline Project" was demonstrated at Google Sydney. This used a timeline updating a map of Europe in World War 2. Military organisations traditionally document battles in the battalion dairy. This timeline mapping technique could be used for an electronic diary. This week ABC Media Watch criticised the Australian Department of Defence for providing minimal information for the public about what is happening in Afghanistan. Perhaps as well as a war artist, there could be a war blogger, providng a timeline map of what is happening. I might ask the symposium about this.

The Department of International Relations of the Australian National University is hosting a two day symposium on "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" in Canberra, 7 to 8 October 2009. The program includes Brigadier Brian Dawson (Director General of Australian Defence Force Public Affairs), Eric Beecher (Crikey.com), Professor Hugh White (ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre) and Mehran Mortezai (Iranian student and Twitterer). The venue is the new hit-tech Hedley Bull Centre at the ANU.

War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media

Today, war is conducted not only by the dispatch of Tomahawks in the air or Kalashnikovs and suicide attacks on the ground but also by means of bytes, tweets, digital images, and social networking forums. (New) media technology, in other words, has become a medium of war and diplomacy.

This multidisciplinary two-day symposium on 7-8 October hosted by the Department of International Relations at the ANU will map the shifting arena of war, conflict, terrorism, and violence in an intensely mediated age. The symposium will bring together international relations academics, media scholars and media practitioners, policymakers and defence staff. It will explore cultural, political, strategic, and technological transformations in media platforms and media participation and assess their impact on policy, publics, and outcomes of political conflict.

The symposium addresses questions such as: What is 'new' about new media? How have the transformations in media technology influenced media-military relations? How have these transformations impacted upon traditional media actors? How are war, conflict, terrorism and violence represented; what are the consequences of these representations? In what ways has new media technology empowered marginalised voices in war, conflict, and terrorism? And how has the transformation of the media landscape impacted on the way states conduct their foreign policy? ...

From: War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media, ANU, 2009


Symposium Program


7 October
9:15 - 9:30Introduction
9:30 - 10:45Keynote address by James Der Derian
From the Image of War to the War of Images
(Live webcast from Brown University)
10:45 - 11:15Morning tea
11:15 - 12:45Panel One: Traditional Voices
Responding to New Toys, New Challenges
Kate Geraghty, Sydney Morning Herald photographer
Prakash Mirchandani, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU
Bill Paterson, Ambassador for Counter-terrorism
Peter Mantello, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan
Brigadier Brian Dawson, Director General Public Affairs, ADF
12:45 - 1:45Lunch
1:45 - 3:00Keynote address by Eric Beecher, Crikey.com
The Changing Media Landscape
3:00 - 3:30Afternoon tea
3:30 - 5:00Panel Two: New Voices
New Media Empowering New Actors
Lisa Goldman, political blogger from Tel Aviv
Sophie McNeill, SBS Dateline video journalist
Mark Andrejevic, University of Queensland
Matthew Hornsey, University of Queensland
Nicholas Farrelly, ANU
Mehran Mortezai, Iranian student and Twitterer
5:00 - 6:30Reception

8 October
9:30 - 10:45Keynote address by Paul McGeough, Sydney Morning Herald
A Correspondent's Journey
10:45 - 11:15Morning tea
11:15 - 12:45Panel Three: War 2.0 - What are We Facing?
How is New Media Shaping Conflict?
Thomas Rid, Authors of War 2.0
Peter Leahy, University of Canberra
Seb Kaempf, University of Queensland
Julie Posetti, University of Canberra
Hugh White, ANU
12:45 - 1:45Lunch
1:45 - 3:00Concluding Plenary
Politics by Other Means?

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Tuesday, September 29, 2009

War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media, Canberra,

The Department of International Relations of the Australian National University is hosting a two day symposium on "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" in Canberra, 7 to 8 October 2009. There is a modest $50 registration fee ($15 for students). The program includes Brigadier Brian Dawson (Director General of Australian Defence Force Public Affairs), Eric Beecher (Crikey.com), Professor Hugh White (ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre) and Mehran Mortezai (Iranian student and Twitterer). The venue is the new hit-tech Hedley Bull Centre at the ANU. I hope to take part in the symposium via the web (from Web Directions South), relating some of my experience setting the Australian Defence Force's policy for the use of the web and Internet.

War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media

Today, war is conducted not only by the dispatch of Tomahawks in the air or Kalashnikovs and suicide attacks on the ground but also by means of bytes, tweets, digital images, and social networking forums. (New) media technology, in other words, has become a medium of war and diplomacy.

This multidisciplinary two-day symposium on 7-8 October hosted by the Department of International Relations at the ANU will map the shifting arena of war, conflict, terrorism, and violence in an intensely mediated age. The symposium will bring together international relations academics, media scholars and media practitioners, policymakers and defence staff. It will explore cultural, political, strategic, and technological transformations in media platforms and media participation and assess their impact on policy, publics, and outcomes of political conflict.

The symposium addresses questions such as: What is 'new' about new media? How have the transformations in media technology influenced media-military relations? How have these transformations impacted upon traditional media actors? How are war, conflict, terrorism and violence represented; what are the consequences of these representations? In what ways has new media technology empowered marginalised voices in war, conflict, and terrorism? And how has the transformation of the media landscape impacted on the way states conduct their foreign policy? ...

From: War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media, ANU, 2009

Symposium Program


7 October
9:15 - 9:30Introduction
9:30 - 10:45Keynote address by James Der Derian
From the Image of War to the War of Images
(Live webcast from Brown University)
10:45 - 11:15Morning tea
11:15 - 12:45Panel One: Traditional Voices
Responding to New Toys, New Challenges
Kate Geraghty, Sydney Morning Herald photographer
Prakash Mirchandani, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU
Bill Paterson, Ambassador for Counter-terrorism
Peter Mantello, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan
Brigadier Brian Dawson, Director General Public Affairs, ADF
12:45 - 1:45Lunch
1:45 - 3:00Keynote address by Eric Beecher, Crikey.com
The Changing Media Landscape
3:00 - 3:30Afternoon tea
3:30 - 5:00Panel Two: New Voices
New Media Empowering New Actors
Lisa Goldman, political blogger from Tel Aviv
Sophie McNeill, SBS Dateline video journalist
Mark Andrejevic, University of Queensland
Matthew Hornsey, University of Queensland
Nicholas Farrelly, ANU
Mehran Mortezai, Iranian student and Twitterer
5:00 - 6:30Reception

8 October
9:30 - 10:45Keynote address by Paul McGeough, Sydney Morning Herald
A Correspondent's Journey
10:45 - 11:15Morning tea
11:15 - 12:45Panel Three: War 2.0 - What are We Facing?
How is New Media Shaping Conflict?
Thomas Rid, Authors of War 2.0
Peter Leahy, University of Canberra
Seb Kaempf, University of Queensland
Julie Posetti, University of Canberra
Hugh White, ANU
12:45 - 1:45Lunch
1:45 - 3:00Concluding Plenary
Politics by Other Means?

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Sunday, July 26, 2009

Second generation Military C2 IT

In "The defence IT crowd" (Jane's Defence Weekly, 27, S. 26-318, July 2009) Adam Baddeley, gives a useful overview of developments with the use of IT for military Command and Communication (C2). He starts with the US Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) built by EDS. One interesting point made is that C2 needs to be combined with administration on the one system. The replacement for NMCI is N-GEN from 2010, however, some NMCI functions will continue into 2012.

Nato plans to have its Deployable Communication and Information System (DCIS) from EADS starting tom 2011. This is intended to support 300 users for three years. Complicating the design is the need to interface with national systems from NATO member countries, thorough something named by someone with a sense of humour the Interface with Nations Module (INM).

What is not clear in all theses military acronyms and claims of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) is exactly what the systems do and what any specific military standards are needed. The use of the web now provides an opportunity to meet many of the military requirements using off-the-shelf technology.

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Sunday, April 05, 2009

Australian electronic warfare aircraft

Boeing EA-18G GrowlerOn 11 September 2008 I suggested a relatively quick and easy purchase for Australian defence would be dozen EA-18G Growler aircraft. The Australian government has decided to do this, having 12 of the F/A-18F Super Hornet, which have already been ordered, wired for electronic attack. .This can be done for the relatively modest cost of A$35M, as the cable can be installed while the aircraft are being made.

There are some difficult decisions for the ADF to make. All that has been ordered is the cabling in the aircraft, not the extra sensors and transmitters to plug into the cable. The full offensive electronic warfare suite for the F18s would cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

The US is unlikely to provide the source codes for the EW software, so that Australia would be dependent on the USA for maintenance, upgrades and local requirements. There would be US imposed restrictions on what Australia could do with the aircraft and the relatively high cost of purchase, training and minenance.

Boeing is considering a export version of the F/A-18G. This would have the cabling and sensors to detect electronic emissions, but not transmitters for jamming. This would allow the aircraft to be sold with fewer export restrictions and be cheaper to buy an maintain. Australian might well choose a middle path, having some aircraft equipped with the full offensive capability and some with just sensors. It might also be worthwile plugging locally developed sensors and transmitters into the pre-installed cabling to customise the aircraft for local conditions.

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Monday, January 26, 2009

The Pentagon: A History

The Pentagon: A History by Steve VogelSteve Vogel's book "The Pentagon: A History" provides a fascinating insight into how military projects are funded and the changes which occur in the development of a project. Also the way the building was designed and constructed is of interest. Some of the history of the construction of the building was repeated in its refurbishment after the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001.

Some of the history I found of particular interest was that the pentagonal design of the building derived from the shape of the block of land it was originally planned to be built on. After the location was changed the design was retained, even though the original rationale for the shape was no longer there. The building was designed and constructed as five units. The plans for the units where partly reused on subsequent units.

The building was originally planned as a temporary headquarters during World war 2. To justify such a large and clearly non-temporary building, it was strengthened to be able to be used as the government archive after the war. The result was that the building was much stronger than needed for offices. This, and reinforcement installed shortly before 11 September, resulted in less damage and fewer casualties than would otherwise be the case. It is surprising that conspiracy theorists made nothing of the fact that the aircraft on September 11 struck the centre of the only wing of the building which had been strengthened against attack, that the work had only just been completed and the attack occurred before all the staff had moved back in.

RussellOne piece of trivia which Steve Vogel might like to put in a later edition is that Washington is not the only capital to have a pentagon shaped national military headquarters. The Defence Headquarters at Russell Offices, in Canberra, is made up of two five sided buildings (with central courtyards like the Pentagon). These are appropriately located just behind the Australian-American Memorial.

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Thursday, October 23, 2008

Running the War in Iraq

Running the in Iraq by Jim MolanGeneral Jim Molan's book "Running the in Iraq: An Australian General, 300,000 Troops, the Bloodiest Conflict of Our Time" gives a useful insight into the complexities and stresses of commanding a modern military force. The general eventually had control of 300,000, mostly American, troops but on his arrival had to find himself a job. Also there were some details of how technology is used in the command centre, with the commanders having regular video conferences, preceded by the support staff spending hours preparing Power point presentations. The use of drone aircraft with the headquarters watching the battle live and the use of instant messaging systems is also mentioned.

You probibly don't get to be a general by being shy or modest, but the book as a little to much self congratulation of leadership attributes and quotes of citations from others. Also the general seems to have been captured by the military obsession with check-lists. At one stage he mentions how difficult it was to get the staff to use a check-list he devised (from memory, it had 48 steps in it).

The best part of the book is early on, describing the initial arrival in Iraq and having to fit into the US military set-up and find a role. While general-ship can't avoid politics, the weakest part of the book is that which tries to justify the Iraq operations. This would have been a better book if that was left for another volume.

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Thursday, September 11, 2008

What Australia should buy for Defence

In a speech to the RSL, the Prime Minister has indicated Australia would increase Defence spending in response to developments in the Asian region. However, defence systems take decades to acquire and Australia has had failures with such projects. But there are some quick and relatively easy, but not cheap, purchases which can be made : electronic warfare aircraft, landing helicopter dock and fast transport ships.

EA-18G Growler Electronic warfare aircraft

Boeing EA-18G GrowlerOne quick and relatively easy purchase for Australia would be a dozen of the EA-18G Growler aircraft. This is the electronic warfare version of the F/A-18F Super Hornet, already ordered by Australia. These could be purchased off the shelf and would make the already ordered Super Hornets more effective. However, the Growler is not perfect: when equipped with its electronic warfare pods, it is slower that the standard F/A-18F. Also Australia would be dependent on the USA for maintenance of the complex electronic systems on board. Later versions of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter are likely to incorporate many of the features of the Growler without a performance penalty, but the aircraft may not be available for decades, if ever.

Canberra class Landing Helicopter Dock ships.

Landing Helicopter Dock ship, Copyright Navantia, 10 August 2005Australia could also order one or two more Canberra class "Landing Helicopter Dock" (LHD) ships. These are aircraft carriers, in all but name, and would be useful for longer range operations. There is no fixed wing aircraft in production suitable for the LHD ships, but they could use various rotary wing manned and UAV aircraft. The could also use the the F-35B is the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the F-35 when (if) it is available.

Hobart class of destroyers

Australia should add at least one, and perhaps more, to the existing order for three Hobart class destroyers. These are coming from the same company building the LHDs and are to a proven design in use by the Spanish Navy, making a reasonably low risk for such a high technology platform. Extra ships would lower the per unit cost of the program and make training and logistics much easier than buying something different.

Australian made Joint High Speed Vessels

HSV-2 Swift United States Navy High Speed VesselA complement to the Canberra class LHDs would be the production of a class of ships referred by the US DoD as Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV). Australian shipbuilders Incat and Austal are the world leaders in the design and building of JHSVs for the US DoD, but have been largely ignored by the Australian military.

In "Widen the Lens for JHSV" (Proceedings of the U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, June 2008 Vol. 134/6/1,264), Commander Robert K. Morrison III and Lieutenant Commander Phillip E. Pournelle (U.S. Navy) suggests widening the role for JHSVs. For the cost of one Canberra class ship, the Australian Defence Force could have a fleet of low cost high speed multi-purpose ships. The JHSVs are ideal as helicopter platforms, due to their large deck area. Apart from the lower purchase cost, these would require a far smaller crew, reducing operating costs and recruitment issues. They could also be used for resupplying other ships and submarines, increasing their effectiveness.

Automation to Reduce Recruitment Issues

One aspect of the adapted civilian design of the high speed transport ships is their level of automation. Given the current difficulty in finding enough defence volunteers, Australia could invest in the automation of its existing and new weapons systems.

It is likely that Australia will want to build more of a replacement for the Collins class submarine. Apart from the technical complexity and risk of the project, there is the problem of how to find the crew to operate them. One way is to increase the automation so fewer people would be needed. Also it is likely they will be equipped with autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) to extend their range (miniature robot submarines, about the size and shape of a torpedo).


... the task of an effective national security policy is to maximise the opportunities and minimise the risks.

Driving much of the change in our region will be the rise of China.

China will be the most dynamic major economy in the first half of this century - followed by India.

According to some estimates, by 2020 China will replace the United States as the world’s largest economy.

China’s economic growth will change the way it sees its own role in the world.

And it will change the way others see China – the Olympics are a great example of that.

Over the long term it is clear that China will have more political influence in our region.

Our other major Asian trading partner, Japan, will remain a major world economy even if it is not recording the growth rates of China.

An ageing population will have a major impact on Japan by 2050, with more than one-third of its population over 65.

But given its stature in the region and its continuing strength, Japan remains a major global and regional power.

The United States is likely to remain the world’s only superpower through to the mid-century.

Over the coming decades, the United States may see its position decline relative to other economies, but it will remain a major economic influence and a powerful source of ideas, innovation and technology in the global economy.

You only have to look at the US’s unmatched capacity for transforming new ideas into new technology.

The United States accounts for around one-third of all world patents.

By contrast, Australia accounted for 1.6 per cent and China 1.8 per cent in 2004.

The United States has shown time and time again that it can rise to any challenge and constantly evolve.

So nobody should ever underestimate the ability of the US to maintain its global leadership role.

The United States will also remain strategically dominant given the vast array of military capabilities available to future US administrations.

The Asia-Pacific region will become more prosperous and its population will continue to grow.

Militarily, however, as it has already become economically and politically, the Asia-Pacific will become a much more contested region.

The region’s total population will exceed four billion by 2020, or 56 per cent of the world’s total.

Australia’s population will only experience modest growth, growing to around 35 million by 2050.

But China’s population is expected to peak at around 1.5 billion in 2030.

India will near the 1.8 billion mark by mid-century.

Indonesia’s population could be as high as 350 million.

The demographic changes in our region will mean that by 2020 when we look to our north, we will see a very different region to the one we see now – one where population, food, water and energy resource pressures will be great.

We have to add one more element to this mix when we are looking at the future, and that is the existing military and political fault lines. ...

From: Address to the RSL National Congress, Kevin Rudd,
Prime Minister of Australia, 9 September 2008


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Monday, July 28, 2008

Publications by Kim Beazley

Professor Kim Beazley has been appointed Chancellor of The Australian National University. He is currently Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Western Australia, but is best known as a politician. An academic is judged by what they publish, so I ought I would do the same sort of quick check of Professor Beazley I would do of anyone else.

A search of the Political Science and International Relations site of UWA gives the bare minimum of information. Professor Beazley has a staff web page, but this just has his name and contact details, with no list of publications, research or courses. On the "Research Interests" page he is listed under Australian political institutions, Public affairs, Australian Government and Politics and Australian foreign policy and diplomatic history, Global and regional governance. But there are no details of research conducted.

The "Contact Us profile" page lists Research Interests as:
  • Defence policy
  • US alliance
  • Middle East
  • Foreign policy issues
  • Australian politics
  • Government
But again there is no actual research or courses detailed.

A Google Schollar search for Kim Beazley as an author produced 44 results (including some from another researcher of the same name in the conservation field). However, as he only took up his UWA position in 2007, there are no publications for that period. Also the list includes some references to Professor Beazley's father Kim Edward Beazley.

Excluding papers which are obviously from other "Beazley" leaves 26. These show a long term interest in defence and foreign policy and domestic public policy issues:

[CITATION] Education in Western Australia: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Education in Western …
K Beazley - Education Department of Western Australia, 1984
Cited by 17 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Arc of Instability
K Beazley - National Observer, 2003
Cited by 3 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Address to the National Press Club
K Beazley - 2006 - Canberra
Cited by 3 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Address to CEDA,‘
K Beazley - Pathways to the Future: A Labor Vision’, Melbourne, 1999
Cited by 2 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] The Defence of Australia 1987
K Beazley - 1987 - Ministerial Statement (Canberra: Australian Government
Cited by 2 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] The Politics of Intrusion: The Superpowers and the Indian Ocean
K Beazley, I Clark - 1979 - Sydney: Alternative Publishing Cooperative
Cited by 3 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Unfinished Business
K Beazley - Essays on Australian Reconciliation
Cited by 2 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Snr
K Beazley - cited in The Australian, 1966
Cited by 1 - Web Search

[CITATION] Labor’s Plan for Telstra and Telecommunications’
K Beazley - Media Statement, 2001
Cited by 1 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Leader of the Opposition,‘Second reading speech: Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 2005–2006’, House of …
K Beazley
Cited by 1 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Leader of the Opposition
K Beazley - Address to the Global Foundation Luncheon, 1998
Cited by 1 - Related Articles - Web Search

Thinking defence: Key concepts in Australian defence planning
K Beazley - Australian Journal of International Affairs, 1988 - informaworld.com
THINKING DEFENCE: KEY CONCEPTS IN AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PLANNING ... I have chosen
this topic because I believe that fundamental misun- derstandings exist in the
community about the foundations of national defence planning. The community ...
Cited by 2 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Labor’s Tax Credit for Working Families’, Labor Herald (June 1998)
K Beazley
Cited by 1 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Australia and the Asia Pacific Region: A Strategy of Self-Reliance and Alliance
K Beazley - address to the Asia Society, Washington, 1988
Cited by 1 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] How May the People Be Heard-Planning for a New Republic Referendum-Process and Content
K Beazley - U. Notre Dame Austl. L. Rev., 2001 - HeinOnline
Web Search

LABOR’S CASE
K Beazley - SYDNEY PAPERS, 2000 - search.informit.com.au
It is always a pleasure to address the Sydney Institute. I’d like to begin
tonight by paying tribute to Gerard and Anne Henderson who have established the
Institute as a first class forum for economic and political debate in this ...
Web Search

[CITATION] speech to Labor delegates
K Beazley - ALP national conference, Hobart, 2000
Web Search

A NATION UNPREPARED
K Beazley - SYDNEY PAPERS, 2005 - search.informit.com.au
Against a global backdrop of increasing concern about terrorism and national
security, Australia’s Labor Opposi- tion continues to call for the
establishment of a Department for Homeland Security. Labor leader Kim ...
Web Search

[CITATION] Australia and Asia
K Beazley - 1989 - Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific, University of …
Web Search

Make Room for Pre-Schools and Child-Care Centers.
K Beazley - Australian Journal of Early Childhood, 1980 - eric.ed.gov
EJ234865 - Make Room for Pre-Schools and Child-Care Centers.
Cached - Web Search

[CITATION] Sydney, 11 December 1999, reported in John Cleary,‘Millennial Visions’
K Beazley, AU Church - The Religion Report
Web Search

TAXPAYERS’MONEYS FINANCING LEFT-OF-CENTRE CAUSES
MP Costello, MK Beazley, MM Latham - search.informit.com.au
3. It may be asked why writers, painters and musicians should be subsidized at
all by taxpayers? Such subsidies have not produced any Australian Beethovens or
Mozarts, Haydns or Bachs, Dickens or Trollopes, or Tolstoys or ...
Web Search

Whither the San Francisco alliance system? - all 3 versions »
K Beazley - Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2003 - ingentaconnect.com
Fifty years on, the system of American-led alliances negotiated in San Francisco
survives. The focal points of the treaty making process were: (1) signing the
Japanese Peace Treaty and accompanying security arrangements to preclude ...
Related Articles - Web Search - BL Direct

More lies on
F Sullivan, AOLK Beazley - LAMP, 2005 - search.informit.com.au
T he Howard government has broken a ‘rock-solid, iron-clad’ election promise
by raising Medicare’s safety net thresholds. Between 300,000 and 400,000
Australians will miss out on a rebate over the next year due to the ...
Web Search

LEADERSHIP IN THE
K Beazley - SYDNEY PAPERS, 2006 - search.informit.com.au
In an important address to The Sydney Institute on Wednesday 24 July 2006,
federal Labor leader the Hon Kim Beazley announced that he would seek an
historic change to his Party’s uranium “no new mines” policy. As he ...
Web Search

THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND CHANGE: THE 1994 GARRAN ORATION
KCB MP - Australian Journal of Public Administration, 1995 - Blackwell Synergy
When he was appointed the Commonwealth of Australia’s first public servant,
Sir Robert Garran was asked to perform a vital duty. The people of Australia had
made a major decision to draw together and become one nation. His role was ...
Related Articles - Web Search


Key authors: K Beazley


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