Web 2 War

In "Using Web 2.0 as a Weapon" (Professional Notes, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, February 2010), Lieutenant Randal T. Jones discusses how RSS feeds, blogs, Wikis and mash ups are being used by the military. The Lieutenant points to the US Army Knowledge Online (AKO) as an example of a secure intranet with RSS feeds and blogs. He cites the US intelligence Intellipedia as an example of a successful classified Wiki and the Army's Tactical Ground Reporting Network (TiGRNET) as a mash-up. I could not find any publicly available references to TiGRNet, but it may be similar to the Tactical Ground Reporting System (TIGR).

However, this use of technology is not all one sided. Later in the same journal, Norman Friedman ("Stealing Signals") reports that from 2004 insurgents in Iraq were intercepting video from US Predator UAVs and have been doing so in Afghanistan as late as 2009. What is not clear is why these signals were being transmitted unencrypted or if they were of any practical value to the insurgents. A few fleeting images from a UAV would be of little value. But Web 2.0 technology is now available to anyone with a smart phone and this could make scattered images of far higher intelligence value.

From Research to the Real World

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where former student Kevin Moore from General Dynamics Mediaware is talking about Commercialising Research: Real-world Applications and Challenges of Digital Video. His company's applications include processing video from the US Predator UAV aircraft used by the US military in Afghanistan and sport video at the Beijing Olympics.

Dr. Moore is discussing how an idea from a research project becomes a commercial product. He pointed out that licensing the intellectual property from a research organisation may take years and require a share of the company or licensing fees . Mediaware obtained government and defence start-up grants, but even so the founders did not take salaries initially and the company started out in a very modest office. The company moved from selling consumer vdeo software to "prosumers". Customers were not just the usual home video market, but also lawyers and professionals. The company is modestly successful, with 90% of the revenue from outside of Australia. In 2008 the company was purchased by General Dynamics, but still operates out of Canberra.

Dr. Moore suggested not "chasing the market" but instead concentrate what real customers need. He used the example of the product InStream. The market was for regioanl TV broadcasters who needed to insert local advertisments into TV content for new HD TV. Existing prodycts ere designed for capital city stations and not affordable for small stations. The traditional was to implement this would be to decode the MPEG video, insert the ads and recode. Mediaware produced a software based system to insert the ads.

From prototype to product took 18 months. This was used by Prime for the Beijing Olympics and won an award. Despite this success, the product still does not have another customer. One problem is that potential customers do not believe that such a product is technically possible and therefore there is not a demand.One obvious use I can see for this technology is to insert information into the video stream from UAV surveillance aircraft.

Dr. Moore then showed examples of JPEG2000 for Wide Area Airborne Surveillance. Military manned and unmanned aircraft in Afghanistan are recording very large amounts of video data over wide areas. This is creating a large data management problem. Mediaware are working on systems to manage this. He commented on the difficulty of collecting requirements from users where the application is highly classified. Another issues is to adjust the quality of the video to suit the avialable military bandwidth.

Dr. Moore then invited the ANU students to apply for a job.

Processing Predator UAV Video

Kevin Moore from Canberra company General Dynamics Mediaware will talk at the ANU in Canberra today about how they compress video, in: Commercialising Research: Real-world Applications and Challenges of Digital Video. Applications include processing video from the US Predator UAV aircraft used by the US military in Afghanistan and the Beijing Olympics. Mediaware hires ANU students to work on software.

Seminar Details
Commercialising Research: Real-world Applications and Challenges of Digital Video
Kevin Moore (General Dynamics Mediaware)
COMPUTER VISION AND ROBOTICS SERIES

DATE: 2010-02-25
TIME: 16:00:00 - 17:00:00
LOCATION: RSISE Seminar Room, ground floor, building 115, cnr. North and Daley Roads, ANU
CONTACT: Jochen.Trumpf@anu.edu.au

ABSTRACT:
MPEG video compression and transmission standards are a major enabling technology driving the digital broadcast and distribution industries. Digital television, IPTV DVDs and Blu-ray Discs all use variants of MPEG to transmit and display content. General Dynamics Mediaware is a Canberra company that has been engaged in research and implementation of MPEG technologies for over ten years, and has emerged as a leading global developer and supplier of compressed digital video processing solutions to the Broadcast and Defence industries.

In this presentation, we will introduce Mediaware's unique compressed-domain frame-accurate MPEG repurposing technologies, whose commercial applications include

- Real-time splicing systems deployed by Prime TV across the Australia's East Coast, facilitating the HD TV broadcast of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games;

- Stream capturing, analysing, annotation, editing software integrated in General Dynamics Multi-Int Analysis and Archive System, and in General Atomics Predator ground station.

We will describe MPEG-4 AVC/H.264, the standard used in HD TV, Blu-ray DVD and by services such as YouTube and iTunes, and present some of the technical challenges of compressed-domain editing given its computational complexity.
BIO:
Dr Kevin Moore is the Chief Technology Officer of General Dynamics Mediaware and is responsible for identifying and developing Mediaware's product and technology strategic vision.

Joining Mediaware in 1998 shortly after it was founded, Kevin was part of the engineering team responsible for the development of Mediaware's core capabilities in native MPEG and H.264/AVC editing, compressed domain scene change detection, video playback, stream capture, and helped build the first two generations of desktop editing products.

Prior to joining Mediaware, Kevin spent 7 years as a Research Scientist at CSIRO, Australia's national science agency, working on a range of image processing and scientific data visualization projects. Kevin has BSc and PhD degrees in Computer Science from the Australian NationalUniversity, and a broad background in video and image processing, high performance computing and software engineering.

Simpler Collins class submarine replacement

The Australian Government is considering a Collins class submarine replacement. Twelve larger, longer range vessels are proposed, which can carry special forces and deliver strategic weapons on land. This is overly ambitious, given that currently only one of the six Collins class submarines is operational. The greater complexity of the proposed replacement the project has minimal of success and it is unlikely that any of the twelve submarines would become operational, if they were built.

An alternative approach would be to prioritise what is required and build simpler, smaller vessels. The primary mission of the submarines is surveillance, secondary is to attack shipping. Accommodation of special forces can be done by providing dual purpose space which can be used for storage or people on a particular mission. Strategic attack of land targets using missiles is not a priority.

Assuming the current Collins class submarines could be made reliable, their capacity to carry special forces and their range could be increased by reducing the weapons systems and loads. Halving the number of torpedo tubes and halving the maximum load of weapons would free up about 50m³ of space, for more supplies or special forces. Using precision guided weapons, less should be needed for any mission.

However, problems would remain with the Collins class. A better alternative would be to build a proven design, with the minimum of modifications. As an example, the German Type 214 submarine is built in several countries. It has a crew of half the Collins class. The 214 design could have half its torpedo tubes and half the weapons storage removed to add more room for stores. The submarine could be lengthened by 6m to add more room. The speed would be reduced, but that is acceptable given the primary mission of the submarine is surveillance.

In addition Australian designed and built Joint High Speed Vessels could resupply the submarines in friendly ports or at sea. The US Defence Department has confirmed it will order two more of these vessels. A fleet of twelve type 214 submarines and six JHSVs to support them would cost less and use a smaller crew than twelve improved Collins class vessels, be faster to bring into service and more likely to actually work.

Electronic warfare and radar imaging aircraft

Professor Chris Baker talked on "Aspects of imaging radar" at The Australian National University, 28 January 2010. He pointed out that high performance computers now allow synthetic radar images to be created on-board aircraft, where previously hours of processing on a ground station would be required. It occurs to me that this could be applied to the Super Hornet EA-18G Growler aircraft the Australian government has ordered. These aircraft could then be used in conditions not suitable for the Boeing Wedgetail.

The EA-18G Growler is designed for electronic warfare. What the Australian Government has ordered is twelve Super Hornet aircraft to be fitted with extra wiring to allow radio transmitters and receivers to be attached to the aircraft. The receivers detect transmissions from enemy communications and radar. The transmitters then send false signals to confuse the enemy. However, Australia has not ordered any electronic warfare equipment for the aircraft, just the wiring. It is likely the USA will not permit Australia to have the most sophisticated equipment for the aircraft, nor allow Australia to modify the software and equipment for local conditions. It is likely that DSTO will develop local equipment for the aircraft.

As the EA-18G aircraft will be equipped with radar frequency transmitters and receivers, these could also be used to provide 360 degree radar coverage around the aircraft. Australia has ordered four Boeing Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft with very large radars and processing capacity. But these are modified airliners and so are slow and vulnerable to attack. The EA-18G is much smaller and faster, but would not normally be considered for a flying radar picket, due to limited space for antennas and processing computers. But as Professor Baker pointed out in his talk, processing power can now be fitted into a much smaller space and can overcome many limitations of the antenna size. High performance computers can be built from video game chips and podcasting can be used to send the resulting images directly to troops on the ground.

Joint High Speed Vessel for US Marines

According to a news report, General James Conway, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, is looking at using the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) as a Marine troop carrier. He is concerned that new US Navy transport ships lack a well deck to launch their equipment at sea. But it occurs to me that the Marines simply drive their Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV) off the ramp of the well deck, they don't flood the deck unless unloading a landing craft. The JHSV is designed with a rear ramp to unload Abrams main battle tanks. The ramp could be lowered into the water and the Marines drive their AAVs off the end. This would also have the advantage that the AAVs could be launched when the ship is underway. It may be possible to recover the AAV's replacement the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) at speed on water.

Australian High Speed Ship to Transport Haiti Aid

The US government is deploying the Australian designed 113 metre high speed catamaran “Huakai” to assist with Haiti relief. Completed last year as a vehicle ferry for Hawaii, the ship can carry up to 800 tonnes at 40 knots. It has a shallow draft of 3.7 m, water jets and 20 metre ramp, allowing it to dock and unload without assictance. It is likely the ship will shuttle between Haiti, Guantanamo Bay and Miami.

A similar operation was carried out by the high speed catamaran HMAS Jervis Bay, operating between Darwin and East Timor from 1999 to 2001. Like Huakai, this was a surplus commercial ferry taken up for government use. The US military were impressed with this and leased a number of Australian designed catermarans.

The US Department of Defence has contracted Austal (who built the Huakai), to build up to ten similar "Joint High Speed Vessels" (JHSV) for military transport. The first named “Fortitude” (JHSV 1) is being constructed in the USA. Tjhis will be followed by Vigilant (JHSV 2) and Spearhead (JHSV 3).

Imaging radar seminar

Chris J Baker will talk on "Aspects of imaging radar" 28 January 2010 at The Australian National University. Prior to becoming Dean of Engineering and Computer Science at ANU, Chris Baker held the Thales chair of intelligent radar systems at University College London.

APPLIED SIGNAL PROCESSING SERIES

Aspects of imaging radar

Chris J Baker (The Australian National University)

DATE: 2010-01-28
TIME: 11:00:00 - 12:00:00
LOCATION: RSISE Seminar Room, ground floor, building 115, cnr. North and Daley Roads, ANU



ABSTRACT:
Improving the resolving ability of a radar systems leads to an increase in information content in the received echo. Perhaps the clearest example of this is two dimensional SAR imaging which provides a map like picture of the surface of the earth. As resolution is increased still further it becomes possible to identify smaller and smaller objects. This seminar begins by exploring the concept of resolution and then goes on to examine techniques for generating high resolution in radar systems including imaging radar. Subsequently, the topic of automatic target classification is introduced very much from a practical systems perspective, reviewing techniques and outlining the current state of the art. Throughout real world examples exploiting data derived from advanced experimental systems are used to demonstrate actual radar and classification performance.

BIO:
Chris Baker is the Dean of the College of Engineering and Computer Science at the Australian National University (ANU). Prior to this he held the Thales-Royal Academy of Engineering Chair of intelligent radar systems based at University College London. He has been actively engaged in radar system research since 1984 and is the author of over two hundred publications. His research interests include, Coherent radar techniques, radar signal processing, radar signal interpretation, Electronically scanned radar systems, natural echo locating systems and radar imaging. He is the recipient of the IEE Mountbatten premium (twice), the IEE Institute premium and is a fellow of the IEE. Until 2008 he was the chairman of the IEE Radar, Sonar and Navigation systems professional network. He is a visiting Professor at the University of Cape Town, Cranfield University, University College London and Adelaide University.

Computer stabilised platform for replenishment at sea

A new option for underway replenishment (UNREP/RAS) of ships is the Ampelmann self stabilising platform. This has computer controlled jacks which compensate for the motion of the ship. This could be used to transfer crew and cargo from a ship to a Collins class submarine, as well as other vessels.

It may be possible to apply the same technology to the jack supported ramps fitted to the the Australian designed Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) being built for the US navy. This would allow the ships to transfer cargo, vehicles and personnel at sea while underway. For safety reasons it might be prudent to use remote controlled fork lift trucks for most cargo transfer.

Defence Budget Audit Needs Needs More ICT

The Minister for Defence, Senator John Faulkner, has released the "2008 Defence Budget Audit" (Pappas Review by George Pappas). Amongst other savings, the report identifies 15 to 30% of possible savings in operating costs for ICT. However, it does not detail this further nor look at the much larger savings (which would be in the billions) by the more effective use of ICT to run Defence. A reduction in ICT spending may be a false economy if it prevents an overall saving in defence, which could be as much as 15% of the total budget.

Rather than the process driven approach which has been tried in Defence many times and failed, I suggest a behaviour driven approach. This would retrain defence staff, both civilian and military with the new skills they need and provide direct incentives for them to use those skills effectively. Also they staff would be provided with the tools to work effectively, particularly ICT systems.

As an example, the audit report identifies video conferencing as a technology for savings, by replacing air travel. However, if staff are not trained in how to use video conference effectively and are not given incentives to use it, the technology will remain underused. At best video conferencing will be used to replace some unproductive face to face meetings with unproductive virtual ones.

Available are:

1. DEFENCE BUDGET AUDIT RELEASED, Media Release, John Faulkner , Minister for Defence, MIN49/09, 17 November 2009
2. Response to the Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009
3. Executive Summary, Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009
4. Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009

The report recommended changes to Defence operations to reduce cost and increase effectiveness. The Government has accepted many of the recommendations, including to reduce the number of ICT contractors used. Recommendations to close smaller defence bases will be delayed until after the next election.

The executive summary states:

Capturing efficiency while reforming ICT. A holistic ICT transformation is planned to significantly improve the quality of the ICT infrastructure provided to Defence. While the current focus on the transformation effort is primarily on quality, there should be an increased focus on capturing the significant efficiencies in the process.

These reforms could save Defence 15 to 30% per year in operating costs, dependent on the future ICT strategy. These savings are estimated at $215 million per year, but have not been analysed in detail because the ICT strategy is beyond the scope of this review.

From: Executive Summary, Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009

Several of the more general recommendations also relate to the use of ICT more effectively (excerpt appended).

Extensive documentation has been provided for the audit, with an executive summary (8 pages), full report (308 pages) and government response (4 pages). One flaw in this is that the response is a secured PDF document which cannot have text copied from it, making analysis difficult.

More seriously, the report itself is provided in the form of a bitmap images with no accompanying text. As a result it is not possible to search the document nor copy text from the document (copying has been barred for this document in any case). Where a document is only available in hard copy form it may be necessary to scan it in for online distribution. PDF has an option to provide an optical character recognition version of the document for searching, which has not been done in this case. Also this document has not been generated from a paper original, it is from a digital original. Those who produced the PDF version will have had to make a deliberate decision not to provide it in an easy to search text format and so as to limit access to the document by the public. Such action by a public servant is unethical and may be contrary to Australian law. In any case the document provided does not meet the Disability Discrimination Act Advisory Notes issued by the Australian Human Rights Commission likely placing the Department of Defence in breech of the Act.

From the Executive Summary, Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009:

Reducing the cost of Defence inputs can be achieved in three ways:

• Reducing non-equipment procurement costs. Defence procures a wide range of commercial products and services such as building services, travel and relocation services. Clear opportunities exist to reduce these costs by:
• Procuring more competitively priced products and services. For example, unbundling routes and removing price arbitrage on removal contracts.
• Changing the specifications for what is required to obtain less costly products, where doing so will not compromise capability. For example, increasing the procurement requirement that military clothing is imported from low cost countries.
• Changing patterns of use. For example, making greater use of Defence’s extensive video-conference network rather than undertaking single day travel.
• These improvements can save Defence between $326 and $518 million per year in non-equipment expenditure.
• Reducing the cost of major equipment procurement.
  

Although a longterm task, there are significant opportunities to reduce the cost of major equipment procurement through:

• Procuring a higher proportion of MOTS equipment
• Increasing the level of competition for major equipment acquisition and sustainment contracts
• Reviewing the proportion of local sourcing which is not justified by strategic requirements.
  

Purchasing a greater proportion of MOTS (which the most recent Defence Capability Plan (DCP) plans for) and increasing the level of competition on major contracts (which partially overlaps with savings identified in the lean backbone section) could ease cost pressures by $345 to $660 million, but these are not ‘banked’ as savings.

• Reducing the cost of combat capability through the use of Reserves.
  Beyond support functions, there is also an opportunity to deliver the same military capability at a lower cost through a flexible surge model. This model makes expanded use of Reserves and deployable contractors.
  These changes could reduce the cost of combat capability by ~$50 million per year.

The total productivity dividend from all of these measures is in the range of $1.3 to $1.8 billion per year, and a one-off saving of $218 to $398 million. The extent of reform required to capture these savings will take 3 to 5 years. The operational cost savings already identified by Defence (as part of the Defence Savings Plan, also know as ‘E2’) have been integrated with or replaced by the Audit savings, which provide analytical substance, much greater detail and show where Defence can go further to realise additional savings.

Removing the long-term structural inefficiencies of a fragmented estate. This can be achieved by starting the process of consolidating estates into an efficient superbase model, laying the foundation for the next ‘S’ curve in Defence productivity. A superbase model would dramatically reduce subscale base costs,
extensive travel and relocation expenses, and the costs associated with managing a complicated supply-chain network.
The estimated yearly savings from a superbase model that would meet Australia’s strategic requirements would increase over time (assuming a staged consolidation), and could reach $700 to $1,050 million by 2035 (in 2008 dollars). ...

From: Executive Summary, Defence Budget Audit, Department of Defence, 17 November 2009

Strategic and technical options for new Australian submarines

In his 2009 Annual Burgmann College Lecture, the Prime Minister proposed a National Security College be set up by the Australian Government and the Australian National University. This would train senior civilian and military officers in strategic matters, including collaborative culture. A practical exercise which the new students could undertake is the design of the new Collins class submarine replacement, combining strategic and technical options in the one process.

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has proposed 12 submarines at a cost of $A25 billion (project SEA 1000). However, there is no proven design for such submarines. Even if they could be built, it is not clear the Australian Government could use such a powerful weapon system effectively. Therefore it would be useful for a mixed team of policy specialists, military and technical specialists to consider what capabilities are feasible and how they might be used.

The preferred ADF option is for a larger version of the current Collins class Australian-built diesel-electric submarines. Even if this is the best option, there are still many details to consider. As an example, one option is to use automation to reduce the crew of the submarine, allowing for more capability in a smaller space. That would require an analysis of what is possible with computer based systems to run a submarine. With effective use of automaton, it may be possible to provide all the desired capability in a submarine the same size as the current Collins class.

There are rapid advances being made in autonomous underwater vehicles (robot miniature submarines). It is likely these will be used for missions currently undertaken by manned submarines. It is likely the Collins class replacement will be equipped to launch and recover several types of AUVs, but what types and for what missions? This will require a knowledge of robotics and AI.

The primary mission of the submarines will be to collect information and to attack shipping. With the development of long range accurate cruse missiles, the submarines may also act as a strategic deterrent. However, Australia does not have a process for making the rapid political decision needed to use such a deterrent. This would require consideration of the political process to be used, as well as how consultations would be made with advisers and the technical communications infrastructure to do that. Even the USA, which has invested considerable resources on strategic decision making over decades, found its decision systems unable to cope with a relatively small scale attack on 11 September 2001.

The Australian Department of Defence issued a Request for Tender for a "Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) Telepresence System". Government agencies are also investing in telepresence systems. However, this would require not only technical compatibility between the military and civilian systems, but also compatible meeting procedures. While the military have long practiced the use of such technology for decision making, this usually does not involve civilian decision makers. Also new systems such as instant messaging on mobile devices create new options and well as creating a risk of subverting established processes. Scenarios could be investigated using tools such as the Delphi Decision Maker.

New options are emerging, such as use of the National Broadband Network, which will be a high speed, relatively secure and reliable network. The "Defence Information and Communications Technology Strategy 2009" makes no mention 0f the NBN.

The ADF has envisioned the Collins class replacement as having a very long range. This is in part due to the long transit times from Australian submarine bases to likely patrol areas. An alternative would be to provide floating support facilities, which could undertake some replenishment at sea and major work at a friendly port.

Replenishment at sea (Underway replenishment UNREP) is not favoured by submariners, due to limited space in a submarine making loading slow and dangerous, with most supplies being loaded by hand down narrow hatches. However, with the design of a new submarine comes the opportunity to incorporate containerised, automated stores handling. This would allow rapid transfer using automated cranes and helicopters.

The RAN's new Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Dock ships will be equipped for rapid stores transfer, as will the Australian designed Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) being built for the US navy. On a smaller scale the Austal Multi-Role Vessel could be used with an unmanned helicopter, such as the Kaman Aerospace Corporation K-MAX, for Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP). However, studies of the technical feasibility, strategic and political implications of this would be needed.

Standard unit loads would prove challenging to accommodate in a submarine. MIL-STD-1660 specifies a 1,016 mm × 1,219 mm 1,814 kg unit load and the "Joint Modular Intermodal Container" (JMIC) is 51.75”L X 43.75”W X 43”H which would be difficult to load into and move about in a submarine. However, the benefits for solving this problem would be substantial. Containerisation of stores and equipment has begun to change the design, operation and strategic uses of surface warships, such as the Absalon class command ship. The same could be applied to submarines, making them quicker to load, replenish and reconfigure.

Proving access ways to accommodate standard unit loads would also allow equipment on the submarine to be palletised and easily replaced. This would allow equipment to be swapped out for maintenance and for different missions. One application of this would be for power. The Collins class vessels have experienced problems with the Hedemora diesel engines. These cannot be easily replaced due to their size. Smaller palletised power units could be removed for service.

Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Martin C. Libicki) is a RAND report for the US Airforce which details the difficulties of dealing with attacks on military and civilian computer infrastructure. It argues that the traditional military doctrine of a threat of a cyber attack to deter an aggressor will not be effective in cyberwarfare. Also conventional military force will have limited value in responding to a cyberattack, due to the difficulty of identifying the attacker.

The book is available as a free e-book: Summary Only (File size 0.3 Mbytes) and Full Document (1.8 Mbytes, 240 Pages), as well as a printed paperback.

Contents

Preface iii
Figures ix
Tables xi
Summary xiii
Acknowledgements xxi
Abbreviations xxiii

Chapter One
Introduction 1
Purpose 5
Basic Concepts and Monograph Organization 6

Chapter Two
A Conceptual Framework 11
The Mechanisms of Cyberspace 12
External Threats 13
Internal Threats 20
Insiders 20
Supply Chain 21
In Sum 22
Defining Cyberattack 23
Defining Cyberdeterrence 27

Chapter Three
why Cyberdeterrence Is Different 39
Do We Know Who Did It? 41
vi Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar
Can We Hold Their Assets at Risk? 52
Can We Do So Repeatedly? 56
If Retaliation Does Not Deter, Can It at Least Disarm? 59
Will Third Parties Join the Fight? 62
Does Retaliation Send the Right Message to Our Own Side? 64
Do We Have a Threshold for Response? 65
Can We Avoid Escalation? 69
What If the Attacker Has Little Worth Hitting? 70
Yet the Will to Retaliate Is More Credible for Cyberspace 71
A Good Defense Adds Further Credibility 73

Chapter Four
why the Purpose of the Original Cyberattack Matters 75
Error 76
Oops 76
No, You Started It 77
Rogue Operators 78
The Command-and-Control Problem 78
Coercion 79
Force 82
Other 86
Implications 90

Chapter FIve
A Strategy of response 91
Should the Target Reveal the Cyberattack? 92
When Should Attribution Be Announced? 93
Should Cyberretaliation Be Obvious? 94
Is Retaliation Better Late Than Never? 96
Retaliating Against State-Tolerated Freelance Hackers 98
What About Retaliating Against CNE? 102
Should Deterrence Be Extended to Friends? 104
Should a Deterrence Policy Be Explicit? 106
Can Insouciance Defeat the Attacker’s Strategy? 108
Confrontation Without Retaliation 109
The Attacker’s Perspective 112
Signaling to a Close 114

Chapter Six
Strategic Cyberwar 117
The Purpose of Cyberwar 118
The Plausibility of Cyberwar 121
The Limits of Cyberwar 122
The Conduct of Cyberwar 125
Cyberwar as a Warning Against Cyberwar 126
Preserving a Second-Strike Capability 127
Sub-Rosa Cyberwar? 128
A Government Role in Defending Against Cyberwar 129
Managing the Effects of Cyberwar 131
Terminating Cyberwar 135
Conclusions 137

Chapter Seven
Operational Cyberwar 139
Cyberwar as a Bolt from the Blue 143
Dampening the Ardor for Network-Centric Operations 149
Attacks on Civilian Targets 153
Organizing for Operational Cyberwar 154
Conclusions 158

Chapter eight
Cyberdefense 159
The Goal of Cyberdefense 160
Architecture 165
Policy 167
Strategy 169
Operations 170
Hardware 171
Deception 171
Red Teaming 173
Conclusions 173

Chapter Nine
Tricky Terrain 175
viii Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Appendixes
A. what Constitutes an Act of war in Cyberspace? 179
B. The Calculus of explicit versus Implicit Deterrence 183
C. The Dim Prospects for Cyber Arms Control 199
references 203 ...

Summary

The establishment of the 24th Air Force and U.S. Cyber Command marks the ascent of cyberspace as a military domain. As such, it joins the historic domains of land, sea, air, and space. All this might lead to a belief that the historic constructs of war—force, offense, defense, deterrence—can be applied to cyberspace with little modification.

Not so. Instead, cyberspace must be understood in its own terms, and policy decisions being made for these and other new commands must reflect such understanding. Attempts to transfer policy constructs from other forms of warfare will not only fail but also hinder policy and planning.

What follows focuses on the policy dimensions of cyberwar: what it means, what it entails, and whether threats can deter it or defense can mitigate its effects. The Air Force must consider these issues as it creates new capabilities.

Cyberattacks Are Possible Only Because Systems Have Flaws

As long as nations rely on computer networks as a foundation for military and economic power and as long as such computer networks are accessible to the outside, they are at risk. Hackers can steal information, issue phony commands to information systems to cause them to malfunction, and inject phony information to lead men and machines to reach false conclusions and make bad (or no) decisions. ...

Operational Cyberwar Has an Important Niche Role, but Only That

For operational cyberwar—acting against military targets during a war—to work, its targets have to be accessible and have vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities have to be exploited in ways the attacker finds useful. It also helps if effects can be monitored. ...

Strategic Cyberwar Is Unlikely to Be Decisive

No one knows how destructive any one strategic cyberwar attack would be. Estimates of the damage from today’s cyberattacks within the United States range from hundreds of billions of dollars to just a few billion dollars per year. ...

Cyberdeterrence May Not Work as Well as Nuclear Deterrence

The ambiguities of cyberdeterrence contrast starkly with the clarities of nuclear deterrence. In the Cold War nuclear realm, attribution of attack was not a problem; the prospect of battle damage was clear; the 1,000th bomb could be as powerful as the first; counterforce was possible; there were no third parties to worry about; private firms were not expected to defend themselves; any hostile nuclear use crossed an acknowledged threshold; no higher levels of war existed; and both sides
always had a lot to lose. Although the threat of retaliation may dissuade cyberattackers, the difficulties and risks suggest the perils of making threats to respond, at least in kind. Indeed, an explicit deterrence posture that encounters a cyberattack with obvious effect but nonobvious source creates a painful dilemma: respond and maybe get it wrong, or refrain and see other deterrence postures lose credibility. ...

Can retaliators hold assets at risk?

It is possible to understand the target’s architecture and test attack software in vivo and still not know how the target will respond under attack. Systems vary by the microsecond. Undiscovered system processes may detect and override errant operations or alert human operators. How long a system malfunctions (and thus how costly the attack is) will depend on how well its administrators understand what went wrong and can respond to the problem. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that attackers in cyberspace will have assets that can be put at risk through cyberspace. ...

will third parties stay out of the way?

Cyberattack tools are widely available. If nonstate actors jump into such confrontations, they could complicate attribution or determining whether retaliation made the original attackers back off.

Might retaliation send the wrong message?

Most of the critical U.S. infrastructure is private. An explicit deterrence policy may frame cyberattacks as acts of war, which would indemnify infrastructure owners from third-party liability, thereby reducing their incentive
to invest in cybersecurity. ...

Responses to Cyberattack Must Weigh Many Factors

In many ways, cyberwar is the manipulation of ambiguity. Not only do successful cyberattacks threaten the redibility of untouched systems (who knows that they have not been corrupted?) but the entire enterprise is beset with ambiguities. Questions arise in cyberwar that have
few counterparts in other media.

what was the attacker trying to achieve?

Because cyberwar can rarely break things much less take things, the more-obvious motives of war do not apply. If the attacker means to coerce but keep its identity hidden, will the message be clear? If the attack was meant to disarm its target but does so only temporarily, what did the attacker want to accomplish in the interim?

Military Cyberdefense Is Like but Not Equal to Civilian Cyberdefense

Because military networks mostly use the same hardware and software as civilian networks, they have mostly the same vulnerabilities. Their defense resembles nothing so much as the defense of civilian networks—
a well-practiced art. But military networks have unique features ...

Implications for the Air Force

The United States and, by extension, the U.S. Air Force, should not make strategic cyberwar a priority investment area. Strategic cyberwar, by itself, would annoy but not disarm an adversary. Any adversary that merits a strategic cyberwar campaign to be subdued also likely possesses the capability to strike back in ways that may be more than annoying. ...

From: Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, Martin C. Libicki, RAND, 2009

War 2.o Live TV with smaller display

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion. Some on low bandwidth and low performance computers may have difficulty with the full live content (I have suggested a lower frame rate video stream be provided), so I have broken out the components: Live TV, Chat, Social Stream and Media stream. Here is the Live TV, reduced to 100 x 80 pixels:Live TV : Ustream

War 2.0 Media Stream

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion. Some on low bandwidth and low performance computers may have difficulty with the full live content (I have suggested a lower frame rate video stream be provided), so I have broken out the components: Live TV, Chat, Social Stream and Media stream. Here is the Media Stream:

Broadcasting Live with Ustream.TV

War 2.0 Social Stream

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion. Some on low bandwidth and low performance computers may have difficulty with the full live content (I have suggested a lower frame rate video stream be provided), so I have broken out the components: Live TV, Chat, Social Stream and Media stream. Here is the Social Stream:

War 2.0 Chat

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion. Some on low bandwidth and low performance computers may have difficulty with the full live content (I have suggested a lower frame rate video stream be provided), so I have broken out the components: Live TV, Chat, Social Stream and Media stream. Here is the Chat:

War 2.0 live TV stream

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion. Some on low bandwidth and low performance computers may have difficulty with the full live content (I have suggested a lower frame rate video stream be provided), so I have broken out the components: Live TV, Chat, Social Stream and Media stream. Here is the Live TV:Live TV : Ustream

War 2.0 streamed live now

The symposium "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" is being streamed live from the ANU in Canberra for the next two days. As well as
Video, there is a Twitter discussion.

I hope to take part in the symposium via the web (from Web Directions South), relating some of my experience setting the Australian Defence Force's policy for the use of the web and Internet.

Last night the "Timeline Project" was demonstrated at Google Sydney. This used a timeline updating a map of Europe in World War 2. Military organisations traditionally document battles in the battalion dairy. This timeline mapping technique could be used for an electronic diary. This week ABC Media Watch criticised the Australian Department of Defence for providing minimal information for the public about what is happening in Afghanistan. Perhaps as well as a war artist, there could be a war blogger, providng a timeline map of what is happening. I might ask the symposium about this.

The Department of International Relations of the Australian National University is hosting a two day symposium on "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" in Canberra, 7 to 8 October 2009. The program includes Brigadier Brian Dawson (Director General of Australian Defence Force Public Affairs), Eric Beecher (Crikey.com), Professor Hugh White (ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre) and Mehran Mortezai (Iranian student and Twitterer). The venue is the new hit-tech Hedley Bull Centre at the ANU.

War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media

Today, war is conducted not only by the dispatch of Tomahawks in the air or Kalashnikovs and suicide attacks on the ground but also by means of bytes, tweets, digital images, and social networking forums. (New) media technology, in other words, has become a medium of war and diplomacy.

This multidisciplinary two-day symposium on 7-8 October hosted by the Department of International Relations at the ANU will map the shifting arena of war, conflict, terrorism, and violence in an intensely mediated age. The symposium will bring together international relations academics, media scholars and media practitioners, policymakers and defence staff. It will explore cultural, political, strategic, and technological transformations in media platforms and media participation and assess their impact on policy, publics, and outcomes of political conflict.

The symposium addresses questions such as: What is 'new' about new media? How have the transformations in media technology influenced media-military relations? How have these transformations impacted upon traditional media actors? How are war, conflict, terrorism and violence represented; what are the consequences of these representations? In what ways has new media technology empowered marginalised voices in war, conflict, and terrorism? And how has the transformation of the media landscape impacted on the way states conduct their foreign policy? ...

From: War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media, ANU, 2009

Symposium Program

7 October
9:15 - 9:30	Introduction
9:30 - 10:45	Keynote address by James Der Derian From the Image of War to the War of Images (Live webcast from Brown University)
10:45 - 11:15	Morning tea
11:15 - 12:45	Panel One: Traditional Voices Responding to New Toys, New Challenges Kate Geraghty, Sydney Morning Herald photographer Prakash Mirchandani, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU Bill Paterson, Ambassador for Counter-terrorism Peter Mantello, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan Brigadier Brian Dawson, Director General Public Affairs, ADF
12:45 - 1:45	Lunch
1:45 - 3:00	Keynote address by Eric Beecher, Crikey.com The Changing Media Landscape
3:00 - 3:30	Afternoon tea
3:30 - 5:00	Panel Two: New Voices New Media Empowering New Actors Lisa Goldman, political blogger from Tel Aviv Sophie McNeill, SBS Dateline video journalist Mark Andrejevic, University of Queensland Matthew Hornsey, University of Queensland Nicholas Farrelly, ANU Mehran Mortezai, Iranian student and Twitterer
5:00 - 6:30	Reception

8 October
9:30 - 10:45	Keynote address by Paul McGeough, Sydney Morning Herald A Correspondent's Journey
10:45 - 11:15	Morning tea
11:15 - 12:45	Panel Three: War 2.0 - What are We Facing? How is New Media Shaping Conflict? Thomas Rid, Authors of War 2.0 Peter Leahy, University of Canberra Seb Kaempf, University of Queensland Julie Posetti, University of Canberra Hugh White, ANU
12:45 - 1:45	Lunch
1:45 - 3:00	Concluding Plenary Politics by Other Means?

Hawkei Australian Light Protected Vehicle

Thales Australia has released images of a mock-up of its Hawkei Protected Mobility Vehicle proposed for the Australian Army under the LAND 121 Phase 4 program. This is a smaller vehicle than the Bushmaster and designed to replace un-armoured Landrovers.

The Hawkei is claimed to "... become a fully integrated node on the network centric battlefield" with C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence). However, apart from having sufficient electrical generating capacity, it is not clear how a vehicle could have C4I fundamental to the design. Computer and telecommunications change much faster than vehicle designs. If the Hawkei had C4I closely integrated, the design would be obsolete with eighteen months.

War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media, Canberra,

Brig. Dawson

The Department of International Relations of the Australian National University is hosting a two day symposium on "War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media" in Canberra, 7 to 8 October 2009. There is a modest $50 registration fee ($15 for students). The program includes Brigadier Brian Dawson (Director General of Australian Defence Force Public Affairs), Eric Beecher (Crikey.com), Professor Hugh White (ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre) and Mehran Mortezai (Iranian student and Twitterer). The venue is the new hit-tech Hedley Bull Centre at the ANU. I hope to take part in the symposium via the web (from Web Directions South), relating some of my experience setting the Australian Defence Force's policy for the use of the web and Internet.

War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media

Today, war is conducted not only by the dispatch of Tomahawks in the air or Kalashnikovs and suicide attacks on the ground but also by means of bytes, tweets, digital images, and social networking forums. (New) media technology, in other words, has become a medium of war and diplomacy.

This multidisciplinary two-day symposium on 7-8 October hosted by the Department of International Relations at the ANU will map the shifting arena of war, conflict, terrorism, and violence in an intensely mediated age. The symposium will bring together international relations academics, media scholars and media practitioners, policymakers and defence staff. It will explore cultural, political, strategic, and technological transformations in media platforms and media participation and assess their impact on policy, publics, and outcomes of political conflict.

The symposium addresses questions such as: What is 'new' about new media? How have the transformations in media technology influenced media-military relations? How have these transformations impacted upon traditional media actors? How are war, conflict, terrorism and violence represented; what are the consequences of these representations? In what ways has new media technology empowered marginalised voices in war, conflict, and terrorism? And how has the transformation of the media landscape impacted on the way states conduct their foreign policy? ...

From: War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media, ANU, 2009

Symposium Program

7 October
9:15 - 9:30	Introduction
9:30 - 10:45	Keynote address by James Der Derian From the Image of War to the War of Images (Live webcast from Brown University)
10:45 - 11:15	Morning tea
11:15 - 12:45	Panel One: Traditional Voices Responding to New Toys, New Challenges Kate Geraghty, Sydney Morning Herald photographer Prakash Mirchandani, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU Bill Paterson, Ambassador for Counter-terrorism Peter Mantello, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan Brigadier Brian Dawson, Director General Public Affairs, ADF
12:45 - 1:45	Lunch
1:45 - 3:00	Keynote address by Eric Beecher, Crikey.com The Changing Media Landscape
3:00 - 3:30	Afternoon tea
3:30 - 5:00	Panel Two: New Voices New Media Empowering New Actors Lisa Goldman, political blogger from Tel Aviv Sophie McNeill, SBS Dateline video journalist Mark Andrejevic, University of Queensland Matthew Hornsey, University of Queensland Nicholas Farrelly, ANU Mehran Mortezai, Iranian student and Twitterer
5:00 - 6:30	Reception

8 October
9:30 - 10:45	Keynote address by Paul McGeough, Sydney Morning Herald A Correspondent's Journey
10:45 - 11:15	Morning tea
11:15 - 12:45	Panel Three: War 2.0 - What are We Facing? How is New Media Shaping Conflict? Thomas Rid, Authors of War 2.0 Peter Leahy, University of Canberra Seb Kaempf, University of Queensland Julie Posetti, University of Canberra Hugh White, ANU
12:45 - 1:45	Lunch
1:45 - 3:00	Concluding Plenary Politics by Other Means?

From: Program for War 2.0: Political Violence & New Media, ANU, 2009

Missions for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles

A Survey of Missions for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (Robert W. Button, John Kamp, Thomas B. Curtin, James Dryde, RAND, 2009) provides a surprisingly detailed and open account of the types of robot submarines the US military do, and might, use. The book suffers from some excess of military acronyms, but is readable by the enthusiast, as well as the specialist. The section on gliders, which can travel thousands of kilometers and remain underwater for months, running on a small battery, should be of particualr interest. A 200 Kbyte Summary and the full 3 Mbyte Full document are available for download for free (I read the paperback edition which can be purchased from RAND).

Contents

1. Introduction
2. UUV Missions
3. UUV Subsystems and Technologies
4. Evaluation of UUV Missions
5. Summary and Recommendations

• Appendix A: UUV Market Survey
• Appendix B: Models Used in This Analysis and Their Implications

The research described in this report was sponsored by the U.S. Navy and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. ...

From: A Survey of Missions for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles. Robert W. Button, John Kamp, Thomas B. Curtin, James Dryde, RAND, 2009

Ship and truck launched Australian Military UAV

In "Robots at war" I mentioned the Aerosonde UAV, which I got to hold some years ago in Melbourne (Australia). Just after writing that I picked up a copy of Defence Technology International (DTI, July/August 2009). This has two full page advertisements for the Aerosonde. One shows it being recovered with a net on the helicopter deck of a US Navy amphibious assault ship. The other advertisement shows the aircraft being launched from a truck mounted catapult and being recovered with a similar net to the one on the ship. The advertisements are from AAi Corp, part of Textron Systems.

What might be a useful capability for the US Marines and for smaller defence forces, such as Australia, would be a truck mounted system which could also be used on board ship. The truck mounted UAV system could be driven onto a transport ship (such as an amphibious assault ship) and operated while on-board. For a semi-permanent installation, the launch and recovery systems could be on pallets transported on a flatbed truck, such as the cargo variant of the Australian made Bushmaster. The pallets could be removed for mounting on the ship.

The Aerosonde was designed to be launched from the roof rack of a car driving on a runway and landed with a belly flop on grass (it has not wheels). This much more gentle than catapult launches and net recovery. The aircraft is made entirely of carbon fibre and so was probably strong enough.

But these advertisements should be treated with caution. Military companies frequently promote concepts as if they were proven products. It is not clear if the photos are of real working systems, or even if they are real photos or digital mock-ups.

Australian National Security College

Last Thursday in the 2009 Annual Burgmann College Lecture, the Prime Minister proposed a National Security College be set up by the Australian Government and the Australian National University. This would train senior civilian and military officers in strategic matters, including collaborative culture.

It happens I attended a short course at the then Australian College of Defence and Strategic Studies. In this as a senior government officer I took part in a role playing exercise with senior military officers on how to deal with a security crisis in South East Asia. This was very different from the average public service course. Later I gave the college a seminar on Internet and web for command and control at a Joint US/Australian military exercise.

The mention of "collaborative culture" by the PM is significant. There may be a role for the use of technology in this training, as this is also being increasingly used for the actual collaboration at senior levels. Both the military and civilian government buildings are being equipped with computers and telecommunications to link them together for meetings. What is lacking is training of the staff in how to make use of these facilities, both the support staff who prepare briefing materials and the senior staff who need to lean new forms of literacy to be able to use the materials.

Recently I was considering how the techniques of mentoring and collaboration I have been using to teach Green ICT, may be applied further. One thought was to develop a course which not only used these techniques for delivery, but also as the topic of the course: teach how to do online collaboration, by using online collaborating. Apart from teaching an essential skill to senior decision makers, this would also have the advantage of reducing the resources required to deliver such courses.

A major problem with courses for senior staff is to get them in one place at the same time for long enough to teach them. One way around this is to give them online courses. This also has the advantage of better simulating the busy environment which the education is for. It also makes best use of very senior instructors.

... I spoke before about the new strategic relationship between the Australian Government and the ANU. To spearhead this new relationship, I want to explore the establishment of a National Security College.

National security is now a very complex policy environment and senior officials need new sets of knowledge and skills to operate effectively and strategically within this new environment. Last December in my National Security Statement I announced the establishment of a national Security Executive Development Program.

The development of this program is underway, however I envisage that this be developed into a suite of world-leading courses that will be undertaken by senior officials working in the national security community.

I want the Program to develop a generation of senior executive officials who will have a shared understanding of the national security strategic environment, architecture and collaborative culture - and a shared understanding of the capabilities, priorities and challenges that exist across the national security community. Such a college would help develop the next generation of national security leaders and more broadly enhance strategic leadership in our community.

To give this program a “home” and recognised brand of excellence, some preliminary discussions have commenced with the ANU about the establishment of a National Security College as a joint venture established under our strategic relationship with the ANU. These initiatives, incorporating national security and public service excellence, would not only help generate the future leaders of the Australian public service.

The strategic relationship would also build the capabilities for university-based experts to support the Government and contribute to policy making. Preliminary discussions will explore models for how such a venture could be progressed. ...

From: 2009 Annual Burgmann College Lecture, Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia at the Australian National University, 27 August 2009

Patterns for Designing Military Computer Applications

NCOIC Patterns are a set of freely guides for designing military computer applications. These would be of use in software engineering courses to teach the use of pattern languages and in building civilian emergency and security systems. NCOIC is a non-profit Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium, promoting the interoperation of computer applications and data communications used by the military.

NCOIC provide numerous technical overviews of their work. These are provided in the form of PDF documents, Powerpoint slides and synchronised multimedia presentations. Unfortunately these suffer the problem of many defence related documents being unnecessarly large and complex.

1. Technical Overview
2. Building Blocks Database
3. Mobile Emergency Communications Interoperability Report
4. Mobile Networking Overview
5. Mobile Networking Evaluation (MNE)
6. Instant Messaging Protocol Functional Collection

Robots at war

"Wired for war : the robotics revolution" (Singer, P. W. 2009) is a very readable book about the use of robots in modern warfare. It suffer from having a very US centric view of the field and providing a few too many anecdotes. But it is an easy read for someone needing an overview.

Singer starts with anecdotes about the use of bomb disposal robots in Iraq. He describes the origins and different development philosophies of the two major companies supplying the US defence department. Having attended a seminar by Professor Rodney Brooks, an Australian from Adelaide and one of the founders of iRobot, I can see that Singer's analysis is insightful.

What is missing is the discussion of the development of robotics outside the USA and the role of the scientific research community. As an example, the Aerosonde UAV, which is now being marketed to the military, was developed in Melbourne, (Australia), for taking meteorological measurements (thus the name "Aero-sonde". The aircraft was later adapted for other remote sensing and military applications.

Aerosonde pioneered small long endurance autonomous UAVs (having flow across the North Atlantic). Previously it was assumed that UAVs small enough for a person to lift would only have a range of a few hours.

One problem with innovation is having something too different from the competition. Aerosonde faced this with their early models which were controlled from an ordinary laptop computer. This removed the need for specialised control units. But rather than being seen as an advantage, this counted as a disadvantage in the logic of military procurement. With the Aerosonde Mark 4.7, released in March, there has been effort to provide compatibility with military UAV systems, such as NATO STANAG 4586 standards for UAV ground stations (also see the STANAG-4586 LinkedIn Group).

Aerosonde also pioneered the idea of UAVs being provided as a service, rather than individual aircraft purchased by the customer. This idea is yet to take off with UAV customers, but with widespread use, it appears an idea who's time has come. This concept is not discussed in Singer's book.

Earlier in the year the Australian and US Defence Departments announced the Multi Autonomous Ground-robotic International Challenge (MAGIC 2010). This is a competition researchers to build a fleet of cooperating autonomous ground vehicle systems (robots) for military and civilian emergency use. These will be tested in Australia in November 2010.

Energy conservation in the Australian Military

The topic of energy conservation appears to have been largely ignored by the Australian military. There are only two papers listed in the Australian Defence Force Journal in the category "energy". These are "Addressing Energy as a Military Cost" (Palmer, 178 Mar/Apr 2009) and "The Compelling Requirement to Energy-Proof the Australian Defence Force (White, 175 Jan/Feb 2008). Palmer provides an overview of some alternative energy sources for deployed forces, such as solar panels, wind power and bio-fuel. However, the obvious first step of reducing energy cost is to reduce the consumption of energy, while Palmer looks at some exotic technologies for this, such as hybrid drives for military vehicles, they miss some of the simpler ones, such as reducing electricity use in bases.

In "Joined-up thinking" (Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 July 2009) Tony Skinner reports on NATO's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system in Afghanistan. This includes the NATO Combined Joint Operations Centre (CJOC) in Kabul. The CJOC has a typical theatre design of room with five large projection screens on one wall, fed from ceiling mounted projectors. There are three twos of tiered seating, with a row of about thirty LCD screens on each of the three rows of desks. Operators have between one and four LCD screens each. There is a further row of seats separated at the very back of the room. Most operator stations also have an IP smart phone.

The CJOC would require a considerable amount of electrical power, both to supply the operator's stations directly and to cool the waste heat from the equipment. From a photograph accompanying Skinner's article, it appear that there is poor energy discipline maintained by the NATO staff, with LCD screens turned on at unused operator stations. Several monitors showing the default Microsoft Windows "screen saver" indicating that the power saving options of the operating system have not been enabled. Also the telephones at unused stations appear to be powered up.

NATO could achieve considerable power savings simply by switching on the power saving options of the workstations. Further savings could be made by replacing multiple screens with more energy efficient large monitors.

The room appears to be equipped with standard office strip florescent lighting. This could be replaced with more energy efficient LED task lightning. Apart from reducing energy use, the task lighting would allow the use of lower energy projection screens. This would also provide a more modular and deployable option, as the task lighting could be provided per workstation.

More energy savings could be made by changing the computer equipment used. Most of the workstations in the CJOC appear to be personal computers. These could be replaced with low power thin clients. Apart from savings in energy use, thin clients would have a lower purchase and maintenance cost and be considerably easier to deploy. If the NATO applications were changed to take advantage of web based technology the size of the servers required could also be reduced.

It should not be surprising if the NATO ICT is not energy efficient, as that does not seem to have been a requirement in tenders for the facility, such as Statement of Work
IFB-CO-12520-OPL BOOK II - PART III (NATO 23 October 2008). The only power consumption requirement included seems to be that it be within the captaincy of the UPS:

1.1.1 NATO forces are currently deployed to Kandahar Airfield (KAF) in Afghanistan
to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. As the NATO
footprint at KAF expands, NATO must provide sufficient Communications and
Information System (CIS) capability to enable those forces to effectively command and control the regional forces, as well as conduct both staff and operational functions at KAF and in the ISAF theatre.

1.1.2 The prime objective of this project is to create a robust, modern CIS
infrastructure at the Kandahar Airfield (KAF) in Afghanistan that shall satisfy the basic requirements for availability, survivability and data recovery following any potential outage. To achieve this, existing CIS systems at Kandahar Airfield must be enhanced, upgraded or replaced to prevent continued reliance on outdated (end of life) and unsupported technology. Some part of the current architecture and
infrastructure has been in theatre for some time under harsh operational
conditions and is prone to system wide vulnerabilities and multiple single
points of failure. Other parts of the infrastructure have been installed as
part of a mitigation plan to accommodate NATO’s increasing need for CIS
capabilities at KAF. ...

Power Provisioning ...

10.14.3 A power generator will be installed for each ADN under a separate
contract in case the 220V grid would not be available at the time of
installation. The Contractor shall validate the power installation
requirements for the ADN shelters during site survey.
10.14.4 The Purchaser will provide and install a building UPS and power
generator at both TCFs via a separate contract. The Contractor shall
validate the power installation requirements for the TCFs during site
survey. The Contractor shall cooperate with the UPS engineer to facilitate
graceful shutdown procedures on all Windows based servers. ...

From: Statement of Work IFB-CO-12520-OPL BOOK II - PART III (NATO 23 October 2008).

Perhaps ADF or NATO staff might like to enrol in my Green ICT Sustainability course.

Military cargo vehicles on test around Canberra

Last week there was a convoy of armoured military cargo vehicles were on test on the highway from Canberra. These were lead by the Copperhead cargo variant of the Australian made Bushmaster. It was followed by a line of other similar sized vehicles with armoured cabs, all carrying standard size concrete block test loads.

The Bushmaster looked the most elegant design, with the cab integrated with under body panels beneath the load bed. It is not clear if the anti-mine armour under the load area has been retained in the cargo version of the Bushmaster. This would have advantages when personnel, valuable or explosive loads are carried, but would limit payload.

The other vehicles appeared to be standard military trucks with armoured cabs added, some appearing very crudely bolted onto the truck chassis.

Second generation Military C2 IT

In "The defence IT crowd" (Jane's Defence Weekly, 27, S. 26-318, July 2009) Adam Baddeley, gives a useful overview of developments with the use of IT for military Command and Communication (C2). He starts with the US Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) built by EDS. One interesting point made is that C2 needs to be combined with administration on the one system. The replacement for NMCI is N-GEN from 2010, however, some NMCI functions will continue into 2012.

Nato plans to have its Deployable Communication and Information System (DCIS) from EADS starting tom 2011. This is intended to support 300 users for three years. Complicating the design is the need to interface with national systems from NATO member countries, thorough something named by someone with a sense of humour the Interface with Nations Module (INM).

What is not clear in all theses military acronyms and claims of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) is exactly what the systems do and what any specific military standards are needed. The use of the web now provides an opportunity to meet many of the military requirements using off-the-shelf technology.

Australia US Military Robot Competition

The Multi Autonomous Ground-robotic International Challenge (MAGIC 2010) is a Australian and US Defence Department competition. Teams of researchers will each be given small research grants of up to $100,000 to build a fleet of cooperating autonomous ground vehicle systems (robots) for military and civilian emergency use. These will be tested in Australia in November 2010.

The Multi Autonomous Ground-robotic International Challenge (MAGIC 2010) is jointly sponsored by the Australian and US Departments of Defence to attract innovative proposals from worldwide research organisations to develop next-generation fully autonomous ground vehicle systems that can be deployed effectively in military operations and civilian emergency situations.

What’s the challenge?
The challenge requires competitors to submit proposals demonstrating the use of multi-vehicle robotic teams that can execute an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance mission in a dynamic urban environment.
Shortlisted competitors will need to field cooperatives of unmanned vehicle prototypes with the ability to autonomously and dynamically coordinate, plan and carry out tasks against changing priorities.
To complete the challenge competitors must: (i) accurately and completely explore and map the challenge area; (ii) correctly locate, classify and recognise all simulated threats; and (iii) complete all phases within 3.5 hours. The challenge event will be conducted in Australia during November 2010.

Eligibility

The challenge is open to national and international organisations from industry and academia. Government organisations are not eligible.

Time Table

MAGIC 2010 will be conducted in two phases:

1. Initial shortlisting of ten teams based on their proposals – 19 October 2009.
2. Grand challenge event – 8-14 November 2010.

Date	Event
1 July 2009	Challenge announced
31 July 2009	Participants Conference, Adelaide ( Australia )
4 Aug 2009	Participants Conference, Frankfurt (Germany)
6 Aug 2009	Participants Conference, TARDEC Warren, Michigan ( USA )
4 Sep 2009	Intention to Compete forms – closing date
2 Oct 2009	Closing date for receipt of technical proposals from competitors
19 Oct 2009	Ten shortlisted teams notified
2 – 13 Nov 2009	Site visits by judging panel for detailed technical assessments of ten shortlisted competitors
16 Nov 2009	Five competitors (out of ten) selected and research contracts awarded - 50% first payment initiated
7-21 June 2010	Site visits to shortlisted competitors by assessment panel. Progress assessments - balance 50% payment initiated
22 Oct 2010	Closing date for submitting MAGIC 2010 Technical Paper for Land Warfare Conference
8-13 Nov 2010	Grand Challenge Event at undisclosed location in South Australia
15-19 Nov 2010	Land Warfare Conference, Brisbane (winners announced).

Research awards

Of the ten shortlisted teams, five teams will be selected to receive US$100,000 each to develop and build their unmanned vehicle prototypes.

After successfully completing the challenge the top three ranked teams will receive US$750,000, US$250,000 and US$100,000 respectively.

Judging

A panel of international experts in the field of robotics, military operations, academia, and defence R&D will be appointed. The judges will be responsible for verifying compliance with the rules and determining the winners.

Proposal presentation

The selected competing teams will be required to submit a detailed technical paper covering all aspects of their technology for presentation and publication in the proceedings of the Land Warfare Conference 2010 being held in Brisbane, Australia from 15 to 19 November 2010.

More information
Detailed information on challenge rules, entry requirements, judging criteria and forms can be accessed here...

From: Multi Autonomous Ground-robotic International Challenge (MAGIC 2010), DSTO, 2009